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ABSTRACT

From a glimmer in the eye of a Victorian woman ahead of her time,
AI has become a cornerstone of innovation that “will be the defining
technology of our time.” Around 2016, the convergence of computing
power, funding, data, and open-source platforms tipped us into an AIdriven 4IR. AI can make a difference in accelerating disruptive innovation
by bringing a data-driven approach to invention and creation. To do so,
the law must embrace change and innovation as an imperative in a
journey towards an ever-shifting horizon. In the creative arts, the work
for hire doctrine provides a pragmatic legal vehicle for interests to vest
and negotiated by the commercial interests best placed to encourage
investment in both the technology and its downstream uses. Like humangenerated work, AI-generated work is an amalgam of mimicry mined from
our own learning and experience. The training data it draws upon, both
for expressive and non-expressive sues, are merely grist for AI’s mill.
Consequently, fair use must be liberally applied to prevent holdup by
copyright owners and stifle transformative uses enabled by AI. AI can
also be used to decipher complex copyright infringement cases such as
those involving musical compositions. In the technological arts, the
controversy will revolve around who owns innovative breakthroughs
primarily or totally attributed to AI. How should these breakthroughs
affect the regard for the notion of PHOSITA? How does AI change the
equation when it comes to infringement? And how can AI help save the
patent system from obsolescence? In these, AI both enables and
challenges how we reward individuals whose ingenuity, industry, and
determination overcame the frailty of the human condition to offer us
inventions that make our lives more efficient and pleasurable. It will take
a clear-eyed view to ensure that copyright and patent laws do not impede
the very progress they were designed to promote.

I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) has rapidly achieved one milestone after
another. The ones we hear about have to do with machines surpassing our
human champions, such as Deep Blue’s win over Chess champion Garry
Kasparov, IBM Watson’s Jeopardy win over human trivia kings, and
Google DeepMind’s Go-playing bot’s win against Korean grandmaster
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Lee Sedol. 1 On the other side are examples of machines working with
humans: augmenting clinicians’ ability to diagnose diseases, 2 big data
analytics empowering content producers to produce music, 3 and even
formulating new varieties of perfume. 4
These stories are stunning from a technical perspective. As the
engine powering the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), 5 AI is a worthy
successor to mechanization, mass production, and automation; each one
has propelled us through the three earlier industrial revolutions. 6 From an
economic perspective, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that AI will add
$15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030, with the United States (U.S.)
seeing a 14.5% increase in gross domestic product from AI alone. 7 From
a legal perspective, AI has already begun to challenge fundamental
notions underlying how and why we incentivize creation and innovation. 8
In October 2018, Christie’s auctioned its first work of art generated
by an algorithm called a generative adversarial network (GAN) that was
fed 15,000 portraits painted between the 14th and 20th century. 9 The
1. Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming 2019).
2. See, e.g., Aaron Gin, FDA Permits Marketing of First AI-based Medical Device; Signals
Fast Track Approach to Artificial Intelligence, PATENT DOCS (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/04/fda-permits-marketing-of-first-ai-based-medical-devicesignals-fast-track-approach-to-artificial-int.html [https://perma.cc/4U9Y-X5EU] (describing how
IDx-DR screens patients for diabetic retinopathy, which can lead to vision impairment and blindness,
using deep learning algorithms. The screening uses standard retinal imaging, takes less than a minute,
and can be performed without a clinician’s interpreting images or results. IDx-DR’s accuracy is about
88%.).
3. Dani Deahl, How AI-generated Music is Changing the Way Hits are Made, VERGE (Aug.
31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/artificial-intelligence-taryn-southernamper-music [https://perma.cc/FJ2Q-4MS6].
4. Chavie Lieber, Christie’s just sold an AI-generated painting for $432,500. It’s already
controversial, VOX (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/29/18038946/artalgorithm [https://perma.cc/AP4S-275G].
5. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, how to respond, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrialrevolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ [https://perma.cc/A92J-WH83].
6. Id. (describing how water and steam technology enabled mechanized production during in
the First Industrial Revolution. Electric power enabled mass production in the Second Industrial
Revolution. Electronics and information technology automated production in the Third Industrial
Revolution.).
7. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Artificial Intelligence Study: Exploiting the AI
Revolution 4 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-theprize-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/69DE-LLKC].
8. See infra Parts III and IV.
9. The genetic adversarial network (GAN) was described in the following way:
The algorithm is composed of two parts,” says Caselles-Dupré. “On one side is the
Generator, on the other the Discriminator. We fed the system with a data set of 15,000
portraits painted between the 14th century to the 20th. The Generator makes a new image
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portrait was created by one computer network (the generating computer)
attempting to convince a second computer (the discriminating computer)
that the image it generated should pass as real art. The discriminating
computer is trained with a myriad of portraits to teach it to discern what a
good portrait looks like so it can play the referee. The generating
computer’s task is to create convincing art through a feedback loop, which
improves both their capabilities over time. 10
The portrait, titled “Edmond de Belamy” from La Famille de
Belamy, depicts a rotund man in a dark coat with a white collar. His face
is a blur, as if the algorithm is implying that all humans look alike. 11 In
this regard, GAN references the past but does so in a way that appears
new. The Belamy portrait forces us to confront the legal implications of
an increasingly thin divide between those algorithms that augment human
endeavors in both the creative arts and technological innovation, and those
that displace them. 12
It will take a clear-eyed view to ensure that copyright and patent laws
do not impede the very progress they were designed to promote.13 There
may be a temptation to cling to romantic notions of creativity and
innovation, praising human genius that created real art in a way we never
do if we realized that they were created by an AI like GAN. People will
nitpick whether the AI that produced a song or drug shows anything more
than derivative creativity or inventiveness honed on human experience
and guided by human programmed code, while ignoring that human
based on the set, then the Discriminator tries to spot the difference between a human-made
image and one created by the Generator. The aim is to fool the Discriminator into thinking
that the new images are real-life portraits. Then we have a result.
Jonathan Bastable, Is artificial intelligence set to become art’s next medium?, CHRISTIE’S (Aug. 20,
2018), https://www.christies.com/features/A-collaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-amachine-9332-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/4TDN-W9BR].
10. Meagan Flynn, A 19-year-old developed the code for the AI portrait that sold for $432,000
(Oct.
26,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
at
Christie’s,
WASH. POST
nation/2018/10/26/year-old-developed-code-ai-portrait-that-soldchristies/?utm_term=.d9a77d1d99e6 [https://perma.cc/LRY2-4V6C].
11. Mallory Locklear, Christie’s will Auction AI-generated Art for the First Time, ENGADGET
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://engt.co/2wPuhbk [https://perma.cc/P3KB-Y3QD].
12. See also Camilla Hrdy, Intellectual Property and the End of Work, FLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
13. See, e.g., Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and
Growth 1 (2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/S98S-8GG6] (“Could it be
true that laws designed more than three centuries ago with the express purpose of creating economic
incentives for innovation by protecting creators’ rights are today obstructing innovation and economic
growth?”); infra Parts III and IV; see Elizabeth Rocha, Sophia: Exploring the Ways AI May Change
Intellectual Property Protections, 28 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 126 (2018)
(discussing trademarks and AI).
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authors and inventors do precisely the same thing. 14 This double standard
will be a sticking point in the 4IR. If a Luddite view prevails, we risk
destabilizing the very foundation of investment, risk-taking, and
entrepreneurship that has propelled the “Progress of Science and the
useful Arts” 15 through liberal encouragement.
This article presents a fresh manifesto on how copyright and patent
law and policy should respond to the wave of AI developments cresting
upon us. 16 Part II provides an overview of AI—how AI evolved from a
glimmer in the eye of a Victorian noblewoman centuries ahead of her time
to reach a tipping point around the year 2016, propelled by a confluence
of computational advancements, investments, open-source platforms, and
a deluge of data. AI birthed from this tipping point has profoundly
augmented and disrupted how we create and invent. Part III addresses
copyright issues in AI and explains the importance of a pragmatic
application of the work for hire (WFH) doctrine as well as the fair use
defense to training data used in machine learning. 17 It concludes by
touching on how AI can be used in copyright enforcement.

14. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Computer Stories: A.I. Is Beginning to Assist Novelists, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/technology/ai-is-beginning-to-assistnovelists.html [https://perma.cc/GS2Q-WA3M] (“Writers are readers, after all. ‘I have read some
uncounted number of books and words over the years that all went into my brain and stewed together
in unknown and unpredictable ways, and then certain things come out,’ Mr. Sloan said. ‘The output
can’t be anything but a function of the input.’”).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. The impact of AI goes far beyond copyright and patent law. See, e.g., Peter Georg Picht
and Benedikt Freund, Competition (law) in the Era of Algorithms, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR
INNOVATION & COMPETITION,
https://www.ius.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:e020bc78-45b4-4e27-a08d87a5a0ac902b/Picht%20Freund__Competition%20law%20in%20the%20era%20of%20algorithms_
_MPI%20Research%20Paper%20no%2018-10__SSRN-id3180550.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9N6F7FJR] (discussing how AI can be used to facilitate collusion by monitoring rival behavior or used to
signal unilateral pricing intentions); Privacy International & Article 19, Privacy and Freedom of
Expression in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 2018),
https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/201804/Privacy%20and%20Freedom%20of%20Expression%20%20In%20the%20Age%20of%20Artific
ial%20Intelligence.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BNP-GCR6] (highlighting the need to safeguard the right
to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, as well as ensure accountability and transparency
of AI); see Mark Lemley and Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3223621
[https://perma.cc/LR2F-T82K]
(discussing a system of remedies for robotic torts); Kari Paul, Why robots should pay taxes,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 28, 2017), https://on.mktw.net/2NlF3QO [https://perma.cc/MF2J-QTBS]
(discussing whether robots should be subject to income taxes just like humans).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (providing that “the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author . . . unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in
a written instrument signed by them” and “owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright”); see 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (providing for “work prepared by an employee in the scope of his or her
employment” and commissioned works in specified categories are considered work for hire).
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Part IV addresses patent issues in AI, beginning with the observation
that current rules may lead applicants into a catch-22. As the human role
becomes minimal or nonexistent, an application attributing invention to a
human inventor may be misleading or even fraudulent. Yet, copyright
law’s WFH doctrine provides a ready solution. However, the potential to
upset the settled position recognizing human rather than corporate
employers as inventors in non-AI inventions may prove too stubborn an
obstacle to overcome.
The increasing primacy of AI’s role in invention may also upend the
“person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA) benchmark used in
most of patent law, covering everything from patent validity to
infringement. 18 Without a requirement to declare the AI’s role in the
invention process, applicants will unfairly be able to enjoy the benefits of
coasting on the AI meta-PHOSITA’s prowess while being judged by the
more limited scope of what humans might find nonobvious or foreseeable
under the doctrine of equivalents.
AI-generated works may infringe on other’s patents rights, raising
questions as to who should be liable. It also raises validity issues as to
whether, and if so which, AI patents should be deemed patent-eligible
subject matter. Finally, the torrential amount of prior art that examiners
and patent attorneys must consider requires AI-assisted due diligence,
search, and examination. Even then, the blending of software into
everything, including the biopharma industry, means that litigation risk
management rather than risk avoidance will increasingly become the
norm. Part V concludes.
II. AI: A PRIMER
If AI had a mother, she would be Ada Lovelace. Also known as
Augusta Ada King-Noel, Countess of Lovelace, Ada was the only
legitimate daughter of Lord Byron. 19 Ada was also a mathematician and
the world’s first computer programmer. 20 Born in 1815, she died at age
18. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018) (forbidding issuance of a patent when “the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018) (requiring that the specification describe the invention “in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use
the same”); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997) (discussing
patent infringement via the doctrine of equivalents depends on the “skilled practitioner’s knowledge
of interchangeability between claimed and accused elements”).
19. Ada Lovelace: Computer Programmer, Mathematician (1815–1852), BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 2,
2014), https://www.biography.com/people/ada-lovelace-20825323 [https://perma.cc/CY34-GBR8].
20. The significance of Ada Lovelace’s contributions has been summarized as the following:
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36. 21 At the time, the term computer was coined to describe female clerical
workers who operated mechanical adding machines.22 Ironically, it was
Ada who, in her short life, published the first-ever algorithm and
envisioned that machines could do much more than make calculations. 23
Yet, the literature on AI usually credits Alan Turing, born nearly a
century after Lovelace, with its parentage. 24 His 1936 paper, On
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,
laid the foundation for computer science by using the theoretical construct
now known as a Turing Machine, a simple device that could compute
anything that is computable and be modified by reading program code. 25
Turing devised a test, known as the Turing Test, where a human asks
questions through a computer screen. 26 If the human cannot decide
whether a human or a machine is responding to those questions, the
machine would be deemed intelligent. 27
Ada described how codes could be created for the device to handle letters and symbols
along with numbers. She also theorized a method for the engine to repeat a series of
instructions, a process known as looping that computer programs use today. Ada also
offered up other forward-thinking concepts in the article. For her work, Ada is often
considered to be the first computer programmer.
Id.
21.
22.

Id.
ANNE MARIE BALSAMO, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE GENDERED BODY: READING CYBORG
WOMEN (1995); see also Computer, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/37975?redirectedFrom=computer#eid[perma.cc/Z2KU-ZVTC
[https://perma.cc/ZYR8ABWR] (defining “computer” as “a person who makes calculations or computations; a calculator, a
reckoner; spec. a person employed to make calculations in an observatory, in surveying, etc.”).
23. Ada Lovelace’s understanding as expressed in her 1843 paper has been described as
What Lovelace saw—what Ada Byron saw—was that number could represent entities
other than quantity. So once you had a machine for manipulating numbers, if those
numbers represented other things, letters, musical notes, then the machine could
manipulate symbols of which number was one instance, according to rules. It is this
fundamental transition from a machine which is a number cruncher to a machine for
manipulating symbols according to rules that is the fundamental transition from
calculation to computation—to general-purpose computation—and looking back from the
present high ground of modern computing, if we are looking and sifting history for that
transition, then that transition was made explicitly by Ada in that 1843 paper.
J. Fuegi and J. Francis, Lovelace & Babbage and the creation of the 1843 ‘notes,’ 25 IEEE ANNALS
HIST. COMPUTING 16 (2003), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1253887 [https://perma.cc/
ZGV6-CWEJ].
24. Nathan Zeldes, Alan Turing: The father of Artificial Intelligence – and much more,
KNOWMAIL (June 7, 2018), https://www.knowmail.me/blog/alan-turing-father-artificial-intelligence/
[https://perma.cc/C7EH-C26M].
25. Entscheidungsproblem, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entscheidungsproblem
[https://perma.cc/4JJW-WCB6].
26. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433 (1950),
https://www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MZN-FJHR].
27. Turing Test, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test [https://perma.cc/
4WV2-4BJR].
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Two years after Turing’s death, Stanford University professor John
McCarthy coined the term artificial intelligence, which he defined as “the
science and engineering of making intelligent machines.” 28 At its
simplest, AI is a compilation of if-then statements—rules programmed by
humans. But McCarthy had an unshakeable optimism that machines
would someday think autonomously, noting that:
The speed and memory capacity of today’s computers may be
insufficient to stimulate many of the more complex functions of the
human brain, but the main obstacle is not the lack of capacity of the
machines, but our inability to write programs that take full advantage of
what we have. 29

McCarthy’s words were prescient and came to fruition in our lifetimes. 30
A.

Machine Learning

AI can simulate physical human processes through machines,
making routine tasks more efficient, such as attaching the front bumper of
a car in an assembly line. 31 AI can also enable “large-scale automation of
entire groups of tasks, including repetitive intellectual tasks previously
performed by human beings.” 32 More than just mimicking the physical
aspects of humans, AI simulates and surpasses human mental processes.
For instance, Kewpie, a food manufacturing company, trained its AI
to sort through more than a million diced potatoes daily, using 18,000
pictures of diced potatoes, doubling its productivity. 33 Similarly, an AI

28. Beatriz Guillen Tores, The True Father of Artificial Intelligence, OPENMIND (Sept. 4,
https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/the-true-father-of-artificial-intelligence/
[https://
2016),
perma.cc/X35T-6SH7] (defining AI as the science and engineering of making intelligent machines
on the basis that “every aspect of learning or feature of intelligence can, in principle, be described so
accurately that you can create a machine that simulates them”).
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. See infra Part II.B.
31. See generally, Michael Copeland, What’s the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence,
Machine Learning, and Deep Learning?, NVIDIA BLOG (July 29, 2016),
https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2016/07/29/whats-difference-artificial-intelligence-machine-learningdeep-learning-ai [https://perma.cc/JW5W-SWVC].
32. Yann Ménière & Ilja Rudyk, The Fourth Industrial Revolution from the European Patent
Office Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA 31, 31 (Xavier Seuba, Christophe Geiger, & Julien Penin eds, June
2018), https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/ceipi-ictsd_issue_5_final_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G7QN-V5ZA].
33. Kewpie’s operations and implementation of artificial intelligence was described in the
following way:
Traditionally, employees visually inspected more than one million diced potatoes per day
for quality assurance. To streamline this time-consuming process, Kewpie used 18,000
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called BioMind beat a team of top radiologists in reviewing magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) images to diagnose brain tumors quickly and
accurately. 34 Cities like New York City routinely employ AI in facial
recognition and license plate matching as part of video camera
surveillance to look for “behavioral anomalies” that signal someone is
about to commit a violent crime. 35
All these forms of AI improve human productivity, stability, and
reliability while mimicking human problem-solving capabilities. 36 AI can
also improve itself by acquiring skills through machine learning and use
iteration, in which data is repetitively fed into an algorithm to improve
outputs, enabling it to accomplish its tasks with limited or no
instructions. 37 In 1959, Arthur Samuel, a pioneer of machine learning,
described AI as a “field of study that gives computers the ability to learn
without being explicitly programmed.” 38 Machine learning may be
supervised, with the algorithm fed labelled data to train it to successfully
differentiate between images. 39 Machine learning may be semisupervised, where the algorithm guesses which categories are unlabeled

pictures of diced potatoes to teach an artificial intelligence system what quality potatoes
look like. The system was thus trained to recognize high-quality potatoes automatically.
Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global Artificial Intelligence Revolution Challenges Patent Eligibility Laws,
13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2017).
34. The human team took 30 minutes and correctly diagnosed 65% of the time. BioMind took
half that time and was correct in nearly the 90% of cases. David Alayon, BioMind, Artificial
intelligence that defeats doctors in tumour diagnosis, MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://medium.com/future-today/biomind-artificial-intelligence-that-defeats-doctors-in-tumourdiagnosis-5f8ec97298b2 [https://perma.cc/BUT6-3F5Z].
35. John R. Quain, Crime-predicting A.I. isn’t science fiction. It’s about to roll out in India,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/could-ai-basedsurveillance-predict-crime-before-it-happens/ [https://perma.cc/2UU3-377Y].
36. Sean Illing, Why not all forms of artificial intelligence are equally scary, VOX (Mar. 8,
2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/3/8/14830108/artificial-intelligence-sciencetechnology-robots-singularity-bostrom [https://perma.cc/M2P8-BF6G].
37. Ian Sample, Google’s DeepMind makes AI program that can learn like a human,
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2017/mar/14/googles-deepmindmakes-ai-program-that-can-learn-like-a-human [https://perma.cc/7AMS-F5NP]; see also, Michael
Borella, The Subject Matter Eligibility of Machine Learning: An Early Take, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 23,
2018),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2018/09/the-subject-matter-eligibility-of-machine-learning-anearly-take.html [https://perma.cc/MG4S-SQPT] (“Machine learning is more than just a buzzword. It
represents a fundamental shift in how problems are solved across industries and lines of business.”).
38. Artificial Inteligence (AI) vs. Machine Learning vs. Deep Learning, SKYMIND,
https://skymind.ai/wiki/ai-vs-machine-learning-vs-deep-learning [https://perma.cc/UG7F-AD2M]
(“Samuel taught a computer program to play checkers. His goal was to teach it to play checkers better
than himself, which is obviously not something he could program explicitly. He succeeded, and in
1962 his program beat the checkers champion of the state of Connecticut.”).
39. ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED
INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 61 (2009).
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images and the results are fed back as training data. Machine learning also
may be unsupervised, where the algorithm can differentiate without a preprogrammed dataset by clustering data based on characteristics. While
human input is needed to specify the seed solutions, fitness measures, and
termination criteria, no human intervention is required during the
program’s execution.
This sort of unsupervised or deep learning brings machine learning
to the next level by mimicking how the human brain works. It does not
break problems down into parts to solve individually. Rather, it solves the
problem from end to end by repeating each generation of solutions until
the algorithm converges on offspring that solve the problem, similar to
what humans do when we learn from experience. 40 This so-called deep
learning powers chatbots like Alexa, Cortana, and Siri, as well as realtime natural language translators. 41 Associated Press uses deep learning
in its Wordsmith AI to generate millions of news stories for financial
services and sports, outpacing the output of all major media companies
combined. 42 It plans to offer medium-specific stories, such as those
published online and read on air by newscasters; publication-specific
stories separately tailored for publications like the New York Times and
Buzzfeed; and customizable stories for individual households by
integrating with other AIs like Amazon’s Alexa. 43

40. Deep learning has been described in the following way:
Deep is a technical term. It refers to the number of layers in a neural network. A shallow
network has one so-called hidden layer, and a deep network has more than one. Multiple
hidden layers allow deep neural networks to learn features of the data in a so-called feature
hierarchy, because simple features (e.g. two pixels) recombine from one layer to the next,
to form more complex features (e.g. a line). Nets with many layers pass input data (features) through more mathematical operations than nets with few layers, and are therefore
more computationally intensive to train. Computational intensity is one of the hallmarks
of deep learning, and it is one reason why GPUs are in demand to train deep-learning
models.
Chris Zhou, How does the complexity of Go compare with Chess?, QUORA,
https://www.quora.com/How-does-the-complexity-of-Go-compare-with-Chess
[https://perma.cc/HNU7-BNLW].
41. Will Knight, A plan to advance AI by exploring the minds of children, MIT TECH. REV.
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612002/a-plan-to-advance-ai-by-exploringthe-minds-of-children/ [https://perma.cc/D633-RMNF] (“Deep learning has, for instance, given
computers the ability to recognize words in speech and faces in images as accurately as a person can.
Deep learning also underpins spectacular progress in game-playing programs, including DeepMind’s
AlphaGo, and it has contributed to improvements in self-driving vehicles and robotics.”).
42. The Associated Press uses NLG to transform raw earnings data into thousands of
publishable stories, covering hundreds more quarterly earnings stories than previous manual efforts,
AUTOMATED INSIGHTS (Feb. 12, 2018), https://automatedinsights.com/customer-stories/associatedpress/ [https://perma.cc/N9JY-JH9R].
43. Id.
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AI can also suggest designs that are structurally unusual and possess
significant functional advantages over the prior art. For instance, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) used its AI to
optimize pre-existing inventions. This is particularly useful where
interrelationships between variables are poorly understood or unknown or
where improvements can produce significant results. NASA designed
miniature satellites used in its Space Technology 5 mission by focusing
the AI on developing antenna designs that met the predefined mission
requirements. 44 Similarly, deep-learning AI helped Hitachi design a nose
cone for the Japanese bullet train, which improved aerodynamic
performance and reduced cabin noise levels. 45 Oral-B devised the crossbristle design of its CrossAction toothbrush using AI, which removed
plaque better than other toothbrush designs. 46 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
applied AI to predict molecule behavior and determine if its drugs would
be beneficial, reducing the cost and time of discovery by 75%. 47 All this
happened because four factors converged around 2015–2016 that tipped
and accelerated the AI wave powering the 4IR.
B.

Tipping Point and Acceleration

Around 2015–2016, the AI revolution reached a tipping point. In
2015, Microsoft Research’s AI surpassed human performance in a test to
identify objects in digital images. AI excelled at “fine-grained
recognition,” which might be a category of expertise beyond the average
person’s abilities but is trivial for massive computer archives of data.48
For instance, humans can easily recognize a bird but may not be able to
identify their species. ImageNet has run the competition annually since
2010, and in 2015, a computer took the crown from the best human score

44. Erica Fraser, Computers as Inventors – Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial
Intelligence on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPTED 305 (2016), https://script-ed.org/?p=3195
[https://perma.cc/3MNW-PWFN] (“This exemplifies that using AI to explore a wide range of
possibilities without the limitations of human preconceptions can produce results with previously
unachievable levels of performance.”).
45. Plotkin, supra note 39.
46. Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1083–85 (2016).
47. See Ben Hirschler, Big Pharma Turns to AI to Speed Drug Discovery, GSK Signs Deal,
REUTERS (July 1, 2017), https://reut.rs/2x0d1Rs [https://perma.cc/4G8D-83VF].
48. Michael Thomsen, Microsoft’s Deep Learning Project Outperforms Humans in Image
Recognition, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelthomsen/
2015/02/19/microsofts-deep-learning-project-outperforms-humans-in-imagerecognition/#267efbe5740b [https://perma.cc/6ZM3-RBLN].
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for the first time. Microsoft’s deep-learning AI won by beating the human
benchmark of 5.1% errors with 4.94% errors. 49

Figure 1. Imagenet Image Recognition. 50
In 2016, Next Rembrandt, a group of museums and researchers in
the Netherlands, unveiled a painting created by AI that mimicked the
subject matter and style of the artist almost indistinguishably. It analyzed
thousands of works by a 17th century Dutch artist and broke them down
into 168,263 fragments before using them to create the painting. 51
Similarly, computer scientists in Tübingen, Germany, trained an AI robot
to paint in Picasso’s signature style. 52 French computer scientists wrote
an algorithm using Bach’s style to compose music so well that half of the

49. R. Colin Johnson, Microsoft, Google Beat Humans at Image Recognition, EE TIMES (Feb.
18, 2015), https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1325712 [https://perma.cc/P8YNVPLU] (attributing its breakthrough to being able to “make [neural] units smarter by allowing them
to take a more flexible form,” where “the particular form of each unit is learned by end-to-end
training”).
50. AI Progress Measurement, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/ai/metrics
[https://perma.cc/3GEG-YLUZ].
51. Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO MAG. (Oct. 2017),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html [https://perma.cc/SD4Q-KE9E].
52. Hashiguchi, supra note 33 (“When a user provides this artificial intelligence ‘maestro’ with
a scenic photograph of Tübingen, with its light pink, yellow, and sky-blue houses facing the Neckar
River, the artificial intelligence produces a painting of this scenery that creates the impression that it
was actually painted by Pablo Picasso.”).
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over 1,200 people who listened to it believed that it was composed by
Bach himself. 53
Also in 2016, a short novel written by a Japanese AI “author” reached
the second round of a national literary prize; 54 DeepMind’s AI generated
music by listening to recordings; 55 and Tesla began rolling out its new
Autopilot hardware for its cars. 56 In 2016, the Committee on Legal Affairs
of the European Parliament pushed for protection of AI-generated
creations, “obviously perceiving a competitive advantage in extending the
copyright framework to machine creation.” 57 And that year, the White
House released, for the first time, two reports detailing how AI would
transform the American economy 58

53. Gaëtan Hadjeres, François Pachet & Frank Nielson, DeepBach: A Steerable Model for
Bach Chorales Generation, 70 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1362–71 (2017),
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v70/hadjeres17a/hadjeres17a.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YFM-ZWBR].
54. Id.
55. Paul Ratner, Listen to New Google AI Program Talk Like a Human and Write Music, BIG
THINK (Sept. 11, 2016), https://bigthink.com/paul-ratner/listen-to-new-google-ai-program-talk-likea-human-and-write-music [https://perma.cc/4J2C-75MH]. One way that DeepMind is different than
traditional methods was described in the following way:
Most research projects train a system by converting the raw sound waves into MIDI files,
which the neural network is expected to recreate. This, it seems, strips away the details
and nuances that are important when it comes to crafting music that sounds realistic. So
instead, the DeepMind gang trained their model directly from raw audio waves, teaching
it to produce raw audio waves – a move other teams are also starting to consider.
Katyanna Quach, Here’s why AI can’t make a catchier tune than the worst pop song in the charts
right now, REGISTER (July 24, 2018), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/07/24/deepmind_ai_music/
[https://perma.cc/8XJW-AD5N].
56. Cadie Thompson, Elon Musk says Tesla will launch its cross-country road trip in a selfdriving car in 3 to 6 months, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/elonmusk-tesla-road-trip-in-autonomous-car-mid-2018-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/7SCH-ZFYG]. This
technology has become so advanced that today, traditional carmakers like Audi, Cadillac, and Volvo
are developing advanced self-driving technology capable of safely shuttling passengers without driver
input. By 2040, one in four vehicles sold are expected to be autonomous. See Jonathan Long, 10
Artificial Intelligence Trends to Watch in 2018, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/307589 [https://perma.cc/M729-UZAY]; Chris Neiger, How to
FOOL
(Apr.
13,
2018),
Make
Money
in
Self-Driving
Cars,
MOTLEY
https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/04/13/how-to-make-money-in-self-driving-cars.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8JH9-554F].
57. Daniel Schönberger, Deep Copyright: Up - and Downstream Questions Related to
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML), in DROIT D’AUTEUR 4.0 / COPYRIGHT 4.0
145–73 (2018).
58. Executive Office of the President, The National Science and Technology Council,
Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence (Oct. 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/pre
paring_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y3C-MKGU]; Executive Office of the President,
Artificial
Intelligence,
Automation,
and
the
Economy
(Dec.
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-IntelligenceAutomation-Economy.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z66K-MG7R].
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One report noted that “[i]n 2016, applicants filed 9,605 AI-related
patent applications in the U.S., a decade-over-decade increase of almost
500%.” 59 Combined, the U.S., China, and Japan account for 74% of the
total AI patents published, with China leading the pack. 60 China also had
half the number of AI-focused companies than the U.S. 61 AI-related patent
application filings in China began outpacing those of the U.S., Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Europe, Japan, and Korea in 2016. 62
The U.S. excels at visionary research and moonshot projects thanks
to its vibrant intellectual environment, unparalleled network of research
universities, and openness to immigration. 63 AI implementation, however,
requires both the ability to adapt public infrastructure to fit AI-innovations
and a private sector that can successfully commercialize AI into viable
products. 64 If AI is to transform the way we innovate and create, then we
will need to embrace the businesses that will invest in the necessary digital
and physical infrastructure. The bottleneck for the U.S. will not be in
major improvements in core algorithms but rather in the policy adaptation
needed to implement such algorithms in commercially viable products
and services to mesh with new technology in public infrastructure and
public institutions.
In the past, the traditional levers of production were capital
investment and labor. These levers, however, had little impact on raising
economic growth recently. 65 Businesses must find new paths to create
growth and value with AI as the primary driver. 66 AI will create jobs in
59. Aaron V. Gin & Michael Krasniansky, Claiming Artificial Intelligence: AI-related Patent
Filing Trends and Practice Tips, MBHB SNIPPETS (2018), https://www.mbhb.com/intelligence/
snippets/claiming-artificial-intelligence-ai-related-patent-filing-trends-and-practice-tips
[https://perma.cc/E8LQ-7DG4].
60. AFD China Intellectual Property, China Busy in Mapping AI Patents, MONDAQ (Aug. 31,
2018),
http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/732208/Patent/Government+to+Ramp+up+Crackdown+on+Count
erfeit+Goods [https://perma.cc/GXS7-C84P].
61. Id.
62. Gin & Krasniansky, supra note 59; see AFD China Intellectual Property, supra note 62
(China’s strength is in the application of AI, but it currently trails the U.S. in areas such as hardware
and algorithms).
63. Kai-Fu Lee, What China Can Teach the US About Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
26,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/opinion/sunday/ai-china-united-states.html
[https://perma.cc/4RGG-97WE].
64. Id.
65. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Intelligent Economies: AI’s Transformation of Industries
and Society, ECONOMIST (2018), https://perspectives.eiu.com/sites/default/files/EIU_Microsoft%20%20Intelligent%20Economies_AI%27s%20transformation%20of%20industries%20and%20society
.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG75-7UEM] [hereinafter “Intelligent Economies”].
66. Id. at 6−7 (reporting that 94% of respondents describe AI as important to solving their
organizational strategic challenges and 84% expect it to have a positive impact on innovation).
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the innovative and creative sectors that patent and copyright stakeholders
care about. But it will also cause other individuals to lose work. 67 It is
futile for Luddites to fight over obsolete technologies and yesterday’s
jobs. Enlighted policymakers in the U.S. will take advantage of the new
opportunities AI offers and upskill to harness the jobs of the future. 68
The tipping point in 2016 results from the convergence of four
factors. First, computer processors attained the miniaturization,
sophistication, and power needed for AI to take off. 69 Coding is typically
labor-intensive, making computing expensive and slow. Computing,
however, has become so cheap that it is more efficient for a computer to
write a program. Equipped with different data sets, software can solve
different problems. In 2016, Wired reported that tech giants like Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, and Baidu would replace central
processing units (CPUs) with graphics processing units (GPUs) as the
main means of computing. 70 The next year, Intel, the world’s largest
chipmaker, announced its ambitions to make AI “available for all” by
building AI capabilities into its chips. 71 Apple is using its Bionic chip
inside iPhones to enable faster on-device AI compared to devices
requiring the cloud to perform AI-based tasks. 72 A smart camera system
running on CUDA cores and DGX-1 box by Nvidia can spot guns in video
footage with 99% accuracy. 73 Using this technology, cameras can

67. The Future of Jobs 2018, WORLD ECON. FORUM (2018), http://reports.weforum.org/futureof-jobs-2018/ [https://perma.cc/J7TQ-V7T8 ] (estimating that by 2025 machines will take over 75
million jobs, or about the half current global workforce, while creating 133 million jobs).
68. Will Knight, MIT has just announced a $1 billion plan to create a new college for AI,
TECH. REV. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/612293/mit-has-justannounced-a-1-billion-plan-to-create-a-new-college-for-ai/ [https://perma.cc/6HPU-P93G] (“With
$1 billion in funding, MIT will create a new college that combines AI, machine learning, and data
science with other academic disciplines. It is the largest financial investment in AI by any US
academic institution to date.”).
69. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
399, 402 (2017) (“A vast increase in computational power and access to training data has led to
practical breakthroughs in machine learning, a singularly important branch of AI.”).
70. Cade Metz, How AI Is Shaking Up the Chip Market, WIRED (Oct. 28, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/B98Rhttps://www.wired.com/2016/10/ai-changing-market-computer-chips/
CFDF].
71. Angela Scott-Briggs, Latest Trends in Artificial Intelligence, TECH BULLION (Feb. 2,
2017), https://www.techbullion.com/latest-trends-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/A6CSFD3Q].
72. Emrah Gultekin, The AI bubble won’t burst anytime soon, but change is on the horizon,
VENTUREBEAT (July 1, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/07/01/the-ai-bubble-wont-burstanytime-soon-but-change-is-on-the-horizon/ [https://perma.cc/GM9D-PJPP].
73. Luke Dormehl, A.I. security camera can identify guns with 99 percent accuracy, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/ai-camera-spots-guns-in-video/
[https://perma.cc/7DV5-MW2Z].
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automatically alert law enforcement to the presence of guns, potentially
saving lives in the process. These technologies are among the fastest
GPUs currently on the market. 74
The second factor was the development of open-source frameworks,
which allowed developers to work synergistically on the same platforms
to build the infrastructure needed for AI-enabled devices to interoperate.75
Interconnected computer processors performing parallel processing are
formed by artificial neural networks. These networks can learn from
historical data and known patterns and apply them in clinical diagnosis
and image analysis. 76 Peer-to-peer networks, such as those used by
cryptocurrencies, empower even small entities to run “advanced AI
programs by harnessing the collective power of networked personal
computers.” 77 GAN was an example of open source sharing that
facilitated the creation of the Bellamy portrait.78
An open-source architecture, however, brings its share of challenges,
particularly to patents covering AI technology. AI patents may be helpful
to attract investment, build a defensive portfolio, or secure a licensing
stream. 79 However, if AI using open-source software is subject to an opensource license itself, the license terms may preclude patenting
improvements to the open-source code, require improvements to be freely
distributed, or force patents to be licensed at no cost to third parties. 80 One
way around this is to carve out a set of standards or protocols for patenting
but leave elements of it as open-source. 81
74. Id.
75. Gultekin, supra note 72.
76. Susan Y. Tull, Patenting the Future of Medicine: The Intersection of Patent Law and
Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 10 LANDSLIDE 40, 41 (2018) (“Neural networks have been used
for diagnosing prostates as benign or malignant, cervical screening, and imaging analysis (including
radiographs, ultrasounds, CTs, and MRIs), as well as for analyzing heart waveforms to diagnose
conditions such as atrial fibrillation and ventricular arrhythmias.”).
77. Long, supra note 54.
78. James Vincent, How three French students used borrowed code to put the first AI portrait
in Christie’s, VERGE (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/23/18013190/ai-artportrait-auction-christies-belamy-obvious-robbie-barrat-gans
[https://perma.cc/VV9V-KXUL]
(“Insiders say the code used to generate these prints is mostly the work of another artist and
programmer: 19-year-old Robbie Barrat, a recent high school graduate who shared his algorithms
online via an open-source license.”).
79. See generally, e.g., Robert Stoll, Alternative Routes to Protection of Innovation,
IPWATCHDOG (June 18, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/13/alternative-routes-toprotection-of-innovation/id=98373/ [https://perma.cc/5JQY-86KE].
80. See generally, e.g., Leslie M. Spencer & Marta Belcher, Blockchain Intellectual Property
(June
21,
2018),
Considerations
for
Innovators
and
Investors,
LEXOLOGY
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7bf415ff-c423-46ef-b88a-660a3e7e303a
[https://perma.cc/VKZ9-BLJ9].
81. Id.
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Third, enough data now exists to meaningfully run AI algorithms. AI
systems need to be trained using vast amounts of data for patternrecognition and predictive analytics. 82 Machine learning is a resourcehungry endeavor, requiring considerable data. Because AI uses
probabilities to determine decisions, more data empowers it to become
better at making predictions. 83 This refers not merely to the number of
users and ability to access the data contributed by those users but also to
the depth of data on each user in the form of their real-world activities to
give a multidimensional picture of each user so AI companies can better
tailor their services. That data allows search engines and online retailers
to predict what consumers are interested in purchasing. 84
The Third Industrial Revolution brought with it massive amounts of
data (2.6 quintillion bytes daily) 85 and the torrent is increasing at an
accelerated rate to feed deep-learning algorithms in every sphere of
creativity and innovation. 86 Banks, insurance companies, and government
agencies have collected data for archival purposes for a long time. Now
they realize they are sitting on gold mines. The Economist boldly declared
that in the 4IR, “[t]he world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but
data.” 87
Fourth, investment in AI projects was sufficiently plentiful. The
McKinsey Global Institute’s report estimated that firms spent between

82. Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias
Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 591 (2018) (“Most AI systems require exposure to significant
amounts of data to automatically improve at a task. These data are referred to as ‘training data.’”);
Benjamin L. W. Sobel, Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45, 58 (2017)
(“These methodologies encourage and reward the acquisition of large amounts of data.”).
83. Long, supra note 56.
84. Sam Baxter, Nothing Artificial About This Intelligence: AI Meets IP, IP.COM (Dec. 18,
2017), https://ip.com/blog/nothing-artificial-intelligence-ai-meets-ip/ [https://perma.cc/AG5QP5UU].
85. Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko, Crafting a Text and Data
Mining Exception for Machine Learning and Big Data in the Digital Single Market, in GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 95, 97 (2018).
86. Claudia Jamin, Managing Big Data in the Digital Age: An Industry Perspective, in GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 149, 151(2018)
(“While less than 10 zettabytes of data were created in 2015, according to the market intelligence
company IDC, expectations go as high as 180 zettabytes of data (or 180 trillion gigabytes) in 2025.”);
see also Bernard Marr, What Is Deep Learning AI? A Simple Guide With 8 Practical Examples,
FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/10/01/what-is-deeplearning-ai-a-simple-guide-with-8-practical-examples/ [https://perma.cc/7BYY-9VFB ] (“Since
deep-learning algorithms require a ton of data to learn from, this increase in data creation is one reason
that deep learning capabilities have grown in recent years.”).
87. The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longeroil-but-data [https://perma.cc/SE79-XQ98].
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$18 billion and $27 billion on AI-related projects, including acquisitions
in 2016. 88 Between 2017 and 2025, market revenue is expected to more
than double from $33.5 billion to $88.5 billion. 89 The investment also
comes in the form of corporate restructuring. Microsoft created the Cloud
and AI Platform to complement its AI and Research group, which it set
up in 2016 to accelerate the adoption. As its CEO noted, “We will
continue to drive investments in A.I.+R across research and A.I.
breakthroughs that are key to [Microsoft’s] long-term success.” 90 Today,
Microsoft has 8,000 workers in those departments. 91
The convergence of these four factors—computing power, open
source platforms, data, and financing—supercharged AI breakthroughs at
an accelerated pace. In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated Gary Kasparov
in chess, a game with 10120 possible moves, more than the number of
atoms in the universe. 92 In 2016, Google’s AlphaGo defeated world
champion Lee Sedol in Go, a game with 10174 moves—”1 million trillion
trillion trillion trillion more configurations than chess.” 93 In 2003, the
human genome took ten years to sequence at a cost of three billion dollars.
In 2013, it took one week and one thousand dollars. As 2017 dawned,
Illumina was poised to do so in one hour at a cost as low as one hundred
dollars. 94 As AI has accelerated toward the tipping point, its development
and dissemination has augmented and disrupted how we create and invent.

88. Tech Platforms Weekly: A Closer Look at Amazon’s Conduct in the Book Market; More
Claims of Search Bias; Facebook, Apple, and Net Neutrality Updates; The Myspace Myth, CAPITOL
FORUM
(Jan.
20,
2017),
http://thecapitolforum.cmail2.com/t/ViewEmail/
j/91CFEB1924D56C52/45A74A929A973E10E663AB054A538FBA [https://perma.cc/CL58-AK79
] (noting how firms spent $2 to $3 billion on AI-related M&A in 2016); Robert Seamans, Artificial
Intelligence Is On The March. But Is Government Ready?, FORBE (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2018/09/05/artificial-intelligence-is-on-the-marchbut-is-government-ready/#6b6faaaa218b [https://perma.cc/AQS8-AYMR].
89. Big data market size revenue forcast worldwide from 2011 to 2027 (in billion U.S. dollars),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/254266/global-big-data-market-forecast/
STATISTA,
[https://perma.cc/TG25-G2RZ].
90. Kevin Parrish, Microsoft ‘excited’ about its secret hardware built for artiﬁcial intelligence,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/microsoft-harry-shumexcited-ai-driven-hardware/ [https://perma.cc/MAY2-4XMF].
91. Id.
92. Curiosity Staff, There Are More Games of Chess Possible Than Atoms in The Universe,
CURIOSITY (June 16, 2016), https://curiosity.com/topics/there-are-more-games-of-chess-possiblethan-atoms-in-the-universe-curiosity/ [https://perma.cc/9UNA-LEEF].
93. Zhou, supra note 40.
94. Sarah Buhr, Illumina wants to sequence your whole genome for $100, TECHCRUNCH
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/10/illumina-wants-to-sequence-your-whole-genome-for(2016),
100/ [https://perma.cc/ZLM7-SMGP].
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Augmentation & Disruption

AI augments what authors and inventors can do. Just as calculators
make advanced mathematics more accessible without innate talent at
arithmetic, AI makes creation and innovation more accessible to a wider
range of people by simplifying tasks and freeing up human experts for
what they do best. 95 Artists today work with a dazzling array of media,
from “fluorescence microscopy, 3-dimensional bioprinting, and mixed
reality, further stretching the possibilities of self-expression and
investigation.” 96 For instance, Wibbitz offers a platform for publishers to
turn written content into video content through AI video production, 97 and
See Sound translates the human voice into digital sculptures, the material,
orientation, shape, and volume of which are defined by the timbre, pitch,
and volume of the artist’s voice. 98
Similarly, AI can accompany a performance or give creative
inspiration to power-through a writer’s block. 99 It can enable services that
deep-dive into the music catalogue and find what traits hit songs share
such as “melodies, pitch, tempo, octave, beat, rhythm, fullness of sound,
chord progression and brilliance.” 100 This information in turn can help
record companies determine which songs to promote as singles and which
to include in an album. 101
While such AI technology assists artists in giving form to their
expression, artists wield them while continuing to express their own
intelligence, insight, and inspiration through the creative processes. These
AI-augmented innovations and creative works are examples of a
technology progressing linearly within the intellectual property (IP)
framework. Even though the AI exercises a degree of autonomy in
generating the work, human input is still necessary for AI to express
95. Guadamuz, supra note 51 (“Since the 1970s computers have been producing crude works
of art, and these efforts continue today. Most of these computer-generated works of art relied heavily
on the creative input of the programmer; the machine was at most an instrument or a tool very much
like a brush or canvas.”).
96. Rama Allen, AI will be the art movement of the 21st century, QUARTZ (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://qz.com/1023493/ai-will-be-the-art-movement-of-the-21st-century/ [https://perma.cc/NR46YVS6].
97. Long, supra note 56.
98. Millchannel, Mill Move Me, See Sound Voice-Driven Sound Sculptures, YOUTUBE (July
20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIctf06yIDk [https://perma.cc/FX6V-K4SF].
99. Stuart Dredge, RoboPop: How will AI and machine learning affect the music industry?,
MUSICALLY (Apr. 20, 2018), https://musically.com/2018/04/20/robopop-ai-machine-learning-music/
[https://perma.cc/2XGF-HW8N].
100. The beat goes on, ECONOMIST (July 9, 2004), https://www.economist.com/
news/2004/07/09/the-beat-goes-on [https://perma.cc/VN8A-T755].
101. Id.
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creativity and may be analogized to a tool that augments human
creativity. 102 There is no collaboration as such.
With advances in machine learning, the interaction between
algorithms and the creative process is changing. AI now allows artists to
find unexpected beauty in chaos and complexity that exceeds the human
grasp, providing humans with the systematic analysis they need to make
the novel leap into something wholly new. 103 These new forms of AI can
interact with artists in a fashion like improvisational jazz, where
musicians feed off cues from each other in a creative feedback loop.
For instance, “generative artists” compose algorithmically or remove
their own personalities from the creative process altogether by ceding
control to self-executing algorithms. 104 By reacting to the AI’s output,
they provide another input to the system, which distills the essence of the
artist’s expression to reach a new paradigm of creativity. 105 Artist
Sougwen Chung trains her AI DOUG with her style of drawing and learns
how it translates her drawing, in turn affecting her own drawing behaviors
in a real-time duet. 106 AI can even be trained to beatbox live with a human
by “parsing his voice, intonation, and rhythms to create new rhythmic
accompaniments and melodies.” 107
Beyond the duet, AI is evolving into autonomous systems that can
learn and produce works that are specifically programmed. 108 The Belamy
portrait exists on a different scale from filters on smartphone apps that
make summer selfies look like a Monet or Picasso. GAN crunches data
about how art has changed over time and generates a work that looks

102. This relationship has been described in the following way:
[T]he scope of that discretion is limited to the operation of programming created by the
human inventors. The significance of this from the copyright perspective is that human
input is still necessary, not only for a work to be produced, but for it to have any sort of
creative content. An expert system has become a tool for human creativity.
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and
Accountability in the 3A Era–the Human-Like Authors Are Already Here–A New Model, 2017 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 659, 674 (2017).
103. Allen, supra note 96.
104. Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 395, 397 (2016).
105. Allen, supra note 96 (“The output of this expression differs categorically from all art
previously made by humans through history, and this intelligent contribution inspires deeper
investigations of the meanings of authorship, creativity, and art.”).
106. Jack Cote, Drawing Operations Unit: Generation 2 (Memory), DIGITAL ART (May 23,
2017),
http://www.digiart21.org/art/drawing-operations-unit-generation-2-memory
[https://
perma.cc/UTL3-28KS].
107. Allen, supra note 96.
108. Guadamuz, supra note 51.
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simultaneously ancient and modern. 109 It learns from the training data and
makes independent decisions throughout the process to determine what
the new work should look like.
Similarly, AI like Google’s Magenta composes music without the aid
of specific algorithms or human intervention, and Google’s DeepMind
generates novel music and artworks by listening to other music or
analyzing existing work online. 110 GAN, Magenta, and DeepMind usher
us into an age where the AI, and not its human partner, is a collaborator,
if not the primary actor, contributing the skill and labor of an artistic
kind. 111 These AI developments tease a future where scientific discovery
and creative expression take place autonomously and humans are only
secondarily responsible.
An artist’s spark of genius dictates his brushstrokes. The spark is
inchoate and cannot be downloaded and decoded, and it is this spark that
has fueled the utilitarian underpinnings of copyright protection. Christie’s
estimated the Belamy portrait to sell for about $10,000. 112 It sold for
$432,000, over 43 times higher than Christie’s own estimate. 113 That sale
raises the stakes in providing answers to fundamental copyright questions
arising from AI technology: Can there be copyright in an AI-created
portrait, even one indistinguishable from those done by humans? Who is
the author and owner—the software’s user, the software’s creator, or
someone else? Who can copy the portrait? With the rapid development of
content creating AI like GAN, these questions must be answered, and
courts will have to grapple with them sooner rather than later.
A similar revolution is happening with inventions. Deep learning can
sift through stockpiles of previously out-of-reach data. 114 These could be
notes buried in old charts or records and tracing data points that led it to
its conclusions. AI-powered diagnostics might use a patient’s medical
record as a baseline to measure deviations and alert their physician of a

109. See Alexander Mordvintsev et al., Inceptionism: Going Deeper into Neural Networks,
GOOGLE RESEARCH BLOG (June 17, 2015), https://ai.googleblog.com/2015/06/inceptionism-goingdeeper-into-neural.html [https://perma.cc/QHG8-TV7M ] (describing Google’s DeepDream, an AI
that can detect and enhance similar patterns in unrelated images).
110. Matt McFarland, Google’s computers are creating songs. Making music may never be the
same, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/
wp/2016/06/06/googles-computers-are-creating-songs-making-music-may-never-be-thesame/?utm_term=.55226125405c [https://perma.cc/4389-VN6N].
111. Schönberger, supra note 57, at 145–73.
112. Flynn, supra note 10.
113. Flynn, supra note 10.
114. Marr, supra note 84 (Deep-learning “allows machines to solve complex problems even
when using a data set that is very diverse, unstructured and inter-connected.”).
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need to follow up. 115 As in the creative arts, the use of AI in medicine has
evolved from augmenting processes to work more fluidly and efficiently,
to clinical detection systems to analyze scans, medical records,
electrocardiograms and the like using coded datasets, to AIs that identify
connections in clinical development and commercialization by asking the
right questions. 116 As one commentator noted, “AI can identify
connections that were previously loosely associated by normalizing
unrelated contexts. This is disruptive because it allows us to
simultaneously generate and test novel hypotheses for a variety of lifescience use cases.” 117
AI screens, compounds, and automates the design of new classes of
drugs, finding new uses for them. 118 “Robot Eve,” an AI, is used in drug
development to fight drug-resistant malaria. 119 It devises hypotheses,
designs experiments, employs automated laboratory equipment to run
experiments, and even interprets the results. The growing role of AI in
drug innovation helps prioritize experiments and substantially reduces the
necessity for experimental work. 120 It could also steer drug companies
toward diagnoses and treatment plans they might not have otherwise
considered. 121
Incentivizing AI-generated work will facilitate a creative
renaissance. AI does not suffer from perceptual limitations the way that
humans do. An example may be seen in the case of patients in Beijing that
doctors said had “no hope” of regaining consciousness. 122 The hospital

115. Intelligent Economies, supra note 65, at 5.
116. Gunjan Bhardwaj, Understanding the Third Wave of AI in Healthcare and Life Sciences,
TECH EMERGENCE (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.techemergence.com/understanding-the-third-waveof-ai-in-healthcare-and-life-sciences/ [https://perma.cc/78FT-KACL].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Robot Eve’s performance has been described in the following way, “Given a set of 5000
molecules, Robot Eve determined the characteristics of the most effective molecules, then screened
only those remaining members of the set that it predicted would be most effective. Through this
process, Robot Eve ‘discovered’ a new anti-malarial use for an existing drug that was previously
known only as cancer inhibitor.” Fraser, supra note 44.
120. Fraser, supra note 44 (“The benefits of employing deep neural networks are particularly
acute when screening against multi-target profiles, which is otherwise extremely difficult and timeconsuming, and sometimes even impossible.”).
121. See, e.g., Mark Bergen, Google Is Training Machines to Predict When a Patient Will Die,
BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-18/google-istraining-machines-to-predict-when-a-patient-will-die [https://perma.cc/PH8G-AK6R] (“Google
researcher said existing models miss obvious medical events, including whether a patient had prior
surgery.”).
122. Stephen Chen, Doctors said the coma patients would never wake. AI said they would–and
they did, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/
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used an AI system to read the patients’ MRI images and predicted they
would wake up in a year. Nine in ten did. The AI was able to do this
because “neural activities are too numerous and sophisticated to be
directly visible to doctors but the AI, equipped with machine-learning
algorithms, is able to scrutinise these changing details and discover
previously unknown patterns from past cases.” 123 The augmentation and
disruption brought on by AI in how we create and invent raise interesting
and important issues in copyright and patent laws.
III. AI & COPYRIGHT
The source code of AI may be protected as literary works under
copyright law. 124 Software protection extends to the original expression
but not to its functional aspects such as formatting, logic, or system
design. 125 It must be original in the sense that authors must create the work
through their own skill, judgement and effort. 126 Neither conception nor
execution alone suffices. Authors must clothe their expressions in a
tangible medium. 127 Assistants executing assigned tasks within the
intended scope of instruction create works, the authorship of which
remains with the ones who instructed them. 128
Copyright law vests rights in an author without defining the term.
With each iteration of technology, courts must determine if a copyright
china/science/article/2163298/doctors-said-coma-patients-would-never-wake-ai-said-they-would
[https://perma.cc/T28Q-UWVC].
123. The article further describes:
For instance, the machine can look into regions in charge of different functions – including
motion control, verbal capability, hearing and vision – to see how they interact with one
another after suffering physical damage.
Some patients might have an active mind, but their communication with the outside world is
temporarily blocked. Their state is more likely to be misjudged by conventional evaluation methods,
which are usually based on operationally defined behavioural responses to specific sensory
stimulation.
Id.
124. See Library of Congress, Copyright Registration of Computer Programs, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC6Y-KFUR].
125. Andrea W. Jeffries et al., Protecting Artificial Intelligence IP: Patents, Trade Secrets, or
Copyrights?, JONES DAY (Jan. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/protecting-artificial-intelligence-ippatents-trade-secrets-or-copyrights-01-09-2018/ [https://perma.cc/PWY3-XXSY].
126. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author,” which means that the work must be
“independently created by the author” and it must possess “at least some minimal degree of
creativity.”).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
128. Andrien v. S. Ocean Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“[W]riters are entitled to copyright protection even if they do not perform with their own hands the
mechanical tasks of putting the material into the form distributed to the public.”).
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exists and if so, who owns the work. 129 Printmakers who engraved copper
plates to print copies of the Bible authored a copyrighted work in their
engravings as much as those who use their laptops to type out their
selection of Beyoncé’s hit music. 130 In each case, there is some modicum
of originality in design, arrangement, selection, or ornamentation.
Similarly, creators who use AI to augment their work can claim authorship
over the resulting work. 131 The outcome becomes less clear when AI like
GAN generates the work with little or no direct guidance from humans,
but the need to ensure that the rules are clear are no less important.
A.

AI as Authors

One possibility is to treat AI as a co-author or even a sole author.
Copyright law confers co-authorship on assistants who contribute in
elaborating the concepts of their collaborators. 132 The law confers sole
authorship if the instructions were merely general ideas and the assistant
ably devises their own plans. 133 Skepticism arises in treating AI-generated
works the same way as works of human authorship because algorithms
“cannot themselves formulate creative plans or ‘conceptions’ to inform
their execution of expressive works.” 134 According to this reasoning, the
spark of creativity the AI displays simply flows from a faithful adherence
to the code simulating human creative genius, which falls short of
authorship required by the law. 135
The U.S. Copyright Office (Copyright Office) determined that it will
register only those works “created by a human being,” 136 while excluding
“works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates
129. Sobel, supra note 84, at 50 (“When novel technologies emerge, society often doubts their
ability to facilitate human expression, particularly when those technologies mediate between a human
subject and the expressive output she creates.”).
130. James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work–And It’s a
Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 408 (2016) (“[T]o complain that these steps are too
mechanical to support a copyright is to go looking for authorship in all the wrong places.”).
131. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining joint authorship as “a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts
of a unitary whole”).
133. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting a concern about
“spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to share the fruits of the efforts of a sole author of
a copyrightable work”).
134. Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 1.
135. SELMER BRINGSJORD & DAVID FERRUCCI, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LITERARY
CREATIVITY: INSIDE THE MIND OF BRUTUS, A STORYTELLING MACHINE xvi (1999) (describing it as
an “attempt to reduce creativity to computation”).
136. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 313.2 (3d ed.
2017).
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randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from
a human author.” 137 When Klein and Bolitho attempted in 1956 to register
a computer-generated song, the Copyright Office rejected it. 138 In a 1973
compendium, the Copyright Office memorialized that copyrightable
works must owe their origin to a “human agent.” 139 One example given
by the Copyright Office is a “weaving process that randomly produces
irregular shapes in the fabric without any discernible pattern.” 140 Since the
programmer of the weaving algorithm is not directly responsible for the
resulting work, it would not be protected by U.S. copyright. This remains
the practice of the Copyright Office today. 141
Whether AI-generated works lie beyond the scope of copyright
protection, however, should be a conclusion, not–as the Copyright Office
suggests–its starting point. This conclusion should flow from a careful
weighing of the merits of protecting it to advance artistic progress. If the
progress of creative output depends on incentivizing its creation, then it is
incumbent on the law to find the proper vehicle to attribute the work’s
expressive value, whether that vehicle is the AI, a human, or a corporation.
In determining the status of AI-generated works under copyright law,
“a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 142 From the founding of
the United States, the States granted Congress the power to protect the
Writings of Authors. 143 These terms “have not been construed in their
narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the
broad scope of constitutional principles.” 144 The term Author means “he
to whom anything owes its origin; originator.” 145 Similarly, the term
Writings includes “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor.” 146 Congress foresaw that new and
137. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 313.2 (3d ed.
2017).
138. Bridy, supra note 104 (“The rejection, for which the Office didn’t offer–and couldn’t have
offered–any statutory basis, revealed a deep-seated if unspoken assumption that authors are
necessarily human”).
139. See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 2.8.3 (1st
ed. 1973) (stating works are not copyrightable if they do not “owe their origin to a human agent”).
140. U.S. Copyright Office, Chapter 300: Copyrightable Authorship: What Can Be Registered,
COPYRIGHT COMPENDIUM III 2014 WL 7749578, at *18.
141. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 313.2 (3d ed.
2017) (The Copyright Office “will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical
process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a
human author.”).
142. N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
144. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
145. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
146. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561.
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unforeseeable technologies would be used to create works of
authorship. 147 Two factors were key in determining what could be
protected: the character of the writing and its commercial importance. 148
As to the first factor, unlike patent law, there is no explicit
requirement that an author be human. 149 U.S. Copyright law confers
protection to “the fruits of intellectual labor . . . founded in the creative
powers of the mind.” 150 The threshold for originality required in those
fruits is low. The law does not arbitrate artistic merit of the work. 151 Thus,
“[a] copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by
a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. [Yet],
[h]aving hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the ‘author’ may adopt
it as his and copyright it.” 152 It is the author’s “personal reaction . . . upon
nature” that renders the work copyrightable. 153
When asked whether photographs were copyrightable in 1884, the
Supreme Court noted that while the “ordinary production of a
photograph” was “merely mechanical, with no place for novelty,
invention or originality,” the “existence of those facts of originality, of
intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the part of the
author” endowed the photograph with copyright protection. 154 It was the
photographer’s “mental conception” in selecting and arranging the
subject’s costume, determining the lighting, and arranging the scene that
conferred the creativity sufficient for authorship. 155

147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining a copy as a work “fixed by any method now known or
later developed” and a “‘device,’ ‘machine,’ or ‘process’” as “one now known or later developed.”).
148. Goldstein discussed factors relevant to protected writings:
The history of federal copyright statutes indicates that the congressional determination to
consider specific classes of writings is dependent, not only on the character of the writing,
but also on the commercial importance of the product to the national economy. As our
technology has expanded the means available for creative activity and has provided economical means for reproducing manifestations of such activity, new areas of federal protection have been initiated.
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562.
149. See infra Part IV.
150. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
151. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (finding that
chromolithographed advertisements for a circus qualified).
152. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).
153. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954) (“Personality always contains something unique.
It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction
in the words of the act.”).
154. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
155. Id. at 54–55, 60.
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Telephone directory listings are too “mechanical or routine,”156 and
animal selfies lack the human origin required to support statutory standing
to sue for copyright infringement. 157 A stick-man sketch by a human hand
has more worth in the eyes of copyright law than the product of the Next
Rembrandt. 158 Some element of human creativity must have occurred
regardless of how the work is done. 159 As one commentator put it, “the
original purpose of IP protection was about promoting sciences and useful
arts [by incentivizing creativity]. Absent this rationale of promotion and
incentive which clearly does not apply to machines, there is no need to
award IP protection to the ‘creator’ of said IP subject matter.” 160
The first possibility, then, is that no AI-generated work is
copyrightable. The primacy of human direction is what infuses
copyrightable subject matter with their “original intellectual
conceptions.” 161 It is not technological wizardry that copyright law

156. Id. at 55.
157. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018).
158. The historical conception of authorship has been described in the following way:
Congress has constitutional authority to create exclusive rights in the writings of authors.
And historically, courts have construed these words liberally, but always with reference to
human genius or intellect. Going back to the early cases, we get the image of the author
as maker or originator in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the author is figured as the embodiment of a unique personality
that mystically passes into a work as it is created.
Bridy, supra note 102, at 398. James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV.
657, 658 (2016) (“[T]he sort of creativity copyright concerns itself with is the product of a specific
human mind.”).
159. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016) (“The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have repeatedly referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’
when analyzing authorship under the Act.”); Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018)
(noting that only humans have standing to sue for copyright infringement); Bridy, supra note 104, at
399 (“[T]here seems to be an assumption, maybe driven by practical and historical considerations,
that authorship means human authorship.”); Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI)
as Authors and Inventors Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 16 (2018)
(noting that both the 1965 Register of Copyrights Annual Report and the 1978 National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) stated that while human generated
works are copyrightable, machine generated works are not. “These conclusions seem to be based on
the same reasoning that the courts applied generally to copyright: the ‘inventive spark’ required for
copyright was fundamentally missing from computer systems, and such capabilities are unique to
humans.”).
160. Amir H. Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for “Hubots”: On the Legal Implications of
Human-Like Robots as Innovators and Creators, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 656 (2017)
(“IP rights granted to Hubots for creation derogates from the collective content with no payoff to the
creator who does not need incentives to function and/or create new content.”).
161. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 58.
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protects but conception by a human being that has been fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. Nothing more is needed. Nothing less will do. 162
There is some support for this view. The length of copyright
protection typically is pegged to the life of the author or joint authors. 163
Moreover, machines are not incentivized by IP. 164 Therefore, arguably, no
IP is needed. If the work falls immediately into the public domain as a
result, it provides fertilizer “to give birth to new artistic genres and whole
new areas of innovation, where humans could build freely upon initial
machine-output[.]” 165 That result is also good for ontological reasons,
argue its advocates:
Artists enjoy the admiration of us fellow humans because given their
talent and efforts they create original works others are not capable of. It
is this ability to vanquish mediocrity that deserves protection and economic reward. . . .Why should anyone still care to create and undergo
all the pains and existential insecurities a creative process entails, if a
machine – that naturally cannot know similar troubles – was treated the
same? Would art not degenerate to a mere commodity, producible and
consumable upon pushing a button? 166

The problem with this view is that it ignores the second basis for
determining what works should be protected. Authorship was meant to be
entrepreneurial rather than an exercise in self-aggrandizement. The
question is not whether machines need incentives—they clearly do not.
The Supreme Court ruled that the limited benefits associated with
copyright ownership are “intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired.” 167 The question therefore is whether
denying copyright protection incentivizes the kind of utilitarian creativity
that results in the public dissemination of the fruits of those activities.
162. Khoury, supra note 162, at 647 (“My view is that Hubots cannot and should not qualify
for IPRs no matter the degree of their independent intelligence.”).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018) (Copyright “endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and 70 years after the author’s death.”); 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2018) (“In the case of a joint work
prepared by two or more authors who did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting
of the life of the last surviving author and 70 years after such last surviving author’s death.”).
164. Schönberger, supra note 57 (“Robots do not need protection, because copyright’s
incentives for creativity will and naturally must remain entirely unresponded to by them.”).
165. Schönberger, supra note 59.
166. Schönberger, supra note 59.
167. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also Kalin
Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA: J. FRANKLIN PIERCE FOR
INTELL. PROP. 431, 438 (2017) (“Copyrighted works not only serve as an incentive to creativity, but
also increase the number of works available in the public domain after their copyright expiration.”).
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Excluding AI-generated work for protection leaves an economic
lacuna, which U.S. IP policy is loath to do. 168 Allowing AI-generated
works to fall into the public domain reduces the incentive to invest in the
growth of the industry. 169 As professors Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman
observed, under this view:
[C]reative production is by its nature a high-risk enterprise. The primary
role of copyright is to protect against copying, so that the large up-front
investment in creative work can be more safely made. In the absence of
such protections . . . the prospect of unrestrained competition from copyists will deter investment in the production of new creative works. The
result will be a persistent undersupply of new artistic and literary creativity. 170

168. Aversion to protection of Monsanto’s AI-developed seeds was present in the following
case:
Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit. After inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be sure, ‘receiv[e] [its] reward’ for the
first seeds it sells. But in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product
and market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its monopoly.
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 285 (2013).
169. Hristov, supra note 169, at 441–42 (“As a result, an effective solution would require that
both the legal status of a copyright holder and the need for incentives for AI developers are considered.
These two important conditions are necessary in order to ensure the legal standing and future
development of the AI sector.”). These problems have been described in the following way:
There is a considerable disadvantage to the release of independently generated AI creative
works into the public domain. Without an established period of protection, there is no
tangible incentive for developers of AI machines to continue creating, using, and improving their capabilities. Simply put, even if programmers and the companies for which they
work have invested a substantial amount of time and money into the creation of AI machines, for the most part, they would not be able to enjoy copyright protection or the financial benefits associated with it. This trend could ultimately limit innovation by dissuading developers and companies from investing in AI research, resulting not only in the
decline of AI but also in the decline of innovation across a number of related sectors.
...
Denying copyright from being issued to developers and owners of AI machines reduces
their incentives to create new AI programs, and may ultimately lead to a lower number of
AI generated copyrightable works and (after expiration of their copyrights) a considerable
decrease in works entering the public domain. As a result, it becomes apparent that immediately releasing AI works into the public domain, as opposed to doing so after a certain
period of copyright protection, significantly decreases incentives for creativity and is
counterproductive to the development of AI.
Hristove, supra note 169, at 438–39.
170. Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Data, Algorithms &
Authorship in the 21st Century, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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Without a legal hook, these works would fall into the public domain,
which could devastate the incentives to invest in AI-generated works. 171
The second possibility is that machines should be recognized as
authors. 172 As the reasoning goes, AI using “deep-learning, neural
networks, and other approaches that do not dictate the purely mechanical
creation of works should be considered a potential author separate and
apart from their human operator. The focus of IP law should be to
recognize the contributions of the creator.” 173 The problem with this view
goes beyond upturning decades of settled jurisprudence, including the
indeterminateness of copyright duration, rights, and liabilities. 174 It would
be nonsense to talk about the life of a machine, the ability to sue a machine
for infringement of derivative rights, or the right of a machine to bring a
suit for infringement of its own rights.
No AI is itself the wellspring of creativity. Rather, the creativity the
AI displays flows either from the algorithm used to design and train it, or
from the instructions provided by the users operating it. 175 Unlike human
beings, algorithms do not have the quintessential lynchpin upon which to
hang creativity—free will. Machine learning allows AI to develop its own
processes in ways that transcend what human programmers can manually
achieve. 176 Indeed, the resulting algorithms are so complex that they
become “black boxes” that elude the ability of the original programmer to
understand how they work. 177 In Part IV.C, this article explains how this
may result in insufficient disclosure, putting the validity of the patent right
171. Guadamuz, supra note 51 (“That would be very bad news for the companies selling the
works. Imagine you invest millions in a system that generates music for video games, only to find
that the music is not protected by law and can be used without payment by anyone in the world.”).
172. See Abbott, supra note 46 (arguing that assigning inventorship and authorship to nonhumans is an innovative new way to encourage AI growth and development).
173. Pearlman, supra note 159, at 36; see also Bridy, supra note 104, at 395 (noting that if
creativity is not defined as a quintessentially human faculty, but could be comprehended alternatively
as a set of traits or behaviors, then creativity might indeed be found in the code of machines).
174. Hristov, supra note 169, at 441 (“This theoretical solution, however, is controversial and
could lead to an uncertain future full of legal challenges and systemic abuse. . . . Redefining copyright
authorship to include non-human authors would undermine the current U.S. legal system, creating
further uncertainty by raising more questions than answers.”).
175. Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 1 (“Every unanticipated machine output arises directly
from some human instruction programmed into the machine. . . . Machines are, in essence, perfect
agents of the humans who design and use them.”).
176. Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 1.
177. See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 886 (2016) (“[M]achine learning tends to create models that are
so complex that they become ‘black boxes,’ where even the original programmers of the algorithm
have little idea exactly how or why the generated model creates accurate predictions.”). These
“learning” techniques depart from other AI techniques sometimes referred to as “expert system”
development.
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itself at risk. With copyright law, however, authors need neither
understand nor explain how the tools they use—cameras, computers, or
AI—render their works of authorship. The touchstone is instead
control. 178
In the case of AI-augmented works, the task in determining copyright
ownership is to distribute rights between two or more contributors. 179
With AI-generated works, AI is simply a means by which one human
creates in a way specified by another. In the analog world, Spirographs,
recipes, and blueprints allow us to create according to another’s specified
instructions. The author for copyright purposes depends on his or her
contribution to the final work. For instance, architects own the copyright
to the buildings they design, not the contractors building them. 180 In
contrast, each child who fills in paint-by-number canvases owns the
copyright to its creation even as the designer owns the copyright to the
template. 181 Autonomous AI-generated work could fall into either
category.
The third possibility is that one legal fiction can be considered both
owner and author of another. A tech company that builds and trains the
AI-generated work is more akin to the architect. In this case, AI-generated
works will be owned by the corporate entity that enables the work to be
created in the first place, a WFH. 182 WFH recognizes the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared as the initial owner of the
copyright unless both parties sign a written agreement to the contrary. 183
The WFH doctrine intends to incentivize employers to provide tools and
direction, and to undertake the risk for work. 184 It operates to vest
178. The issue of control as it relates to authorship was described in the following way.
“Artificially intelligent machines, therefore, do not usurp human authorship as long as humans
sufficiently ‘control’ them. Since we have posited that computers cannot run off on a ‘frolic of their
own,’ some humans will wield the requisite control; the question is whether the reins are in the hands
of the machine’s designers or its users.” Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 1.
179. Grimmelmann, supra note 130, at 411 (“The problem of allocating ownership between
programmers and users is just a special case of this more general and very familiar problem.”).
180. Grimmelmann, supra note 130, at 411 (“Sometimes, the author of the instructions is
regarded as the sole author of the output; architects own copyright in built buildings, not the
contractors who actually do the construction work.”).
181. Grimmelmann, supra note 130, at 411 (“[I]f a ‘distinguishable variation’ is enough for a
copyright in a work created to the plan of another, I own the paint-by-numbers canvas I fill in, even
if I only color inside the lines.”).
182. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 102 (“I suggest the adoption of the [WFH] doctrine for AI
systems, which considers the system to be the creative employee or creative independent contractor,
thus entitling the rights to another entity to be responsible for the outcomes of the AI system.”).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2018).
184. The policy underlying the WFH doctrine has been described in the following way:
The policy rationale for this doctrine is to incentivize the employer or primary contractor
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copyright to the AI-generated work in a corporation in the first instance,
without the operation of law. 185 The WFH doctrine recognizes the
corporate employer or the individual commissioning the work as the legal
author of the work and the employee or contractor as the author-in-fact. 186
Granting copyright to the person who made the AI possible seems to be
the most sensible approach. As one commentator noted, “[s]uch an
approach will ensure that companies keep investing in the technology,
safe in the knowledge that they will get a return on their investment.” 187
A multitude of stakeholders contribute to creating, designing,
developing and producing AI systems. These include data suppliers,
trainers, feedback suppliers, and system operators. The corporation
provides a vehicle to exploit the rights and accept responsibility for
liabilities, and a commercially expedient alternative to human authorship,
with its messy web of potential ownership claims. 188 WFH imposes
accountability on corporations for criminal violations, infringement, and
other tortious acts 189 while synchronizing the promotion of technological
at whose instance, direction, use, commercial purposes or risk the work is prepared, as
well as to give them control over the commercial force regarding the work. The idea and
the outcome is that the employer or primary contractor, rather than the creator (who is an
employee or sub-contractor), has the responsibility for and the accountability over the actions of the creator in regards to, inter alia, infringements of the law and harm caused by
the work.
Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 102, at 711. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 100, at 711 (“The justification for
giving the entitlement of ownership to economic entities is rooted in the incentive theory as well. This
legally sanctioned monopoly allows the users to use, sell, or distribute the works more efficiently, as
well as to be accountable for avoiding infringements and counterfeits.”).
185. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (Ownership “vest initially in the author or authors of the work.”);
Bridy, supra note 104, at 400 (“[by] operation of law from an employee-author to her corporate
employer, thus maintaining in principle a human monopoly on authorship, but it wasn’t.”).
186. The relationship between the WFH doctrine and the rest of copyright law has been
described in the following way.
The [WFH] rule is thus an exception to the general principle of copyright ownership. Usually, the copyright becomes the property of the author once the creation meets the demands
of the law. However, if a work is made for hire, the employer or the one who commissioned the work would be considered the author, even if an employee or subcontractor
actually created the work. The employer could be a firm, an organization, or an individual.
...
This doctrine is an important and major exception to the general rule that copyright protection properly rests with the one or the many who actually created the work. The Copyright Act named the employer and main contractor as the authors of the work even though
they have not actually created the work.
Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 100, at 708–11.
187. Guadamuz, supra note 51.
188. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Untangling the complex,
difficult-to-access, and often phantom chain of title to tens, hundreds, or even thousands of standalone
copyrights is a task that could tie the distribution chain in knots.”).
189. The liability of a human for the act of a robot has been described in the following way:
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progress with artistic progress. 190 The corporation maintains the copyright
for 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever
expires first. 191 WFH thus decouples the need to find a nominal human
author in the value chain without vesting rights in an algorithm. 192
If the company developing the AI merely provides a malleable tool
for downstream firms to train, the resulting works would belong to the
firm as a WFH in the same way that a child filling in a paint-by-number
owns the copyright to his or her creation. Just as the designer of the paintby-number owns the copyright to the template, the company that
developed the AI would retain ownership of the algorithm. What happens
if an individual, rather than a firm, trains the AI? The result would be the
same. At the fringes, businesses can use contracts. These license
agreements would clearly define who owns rights in AI-generated works
and in improvements generated by the AI’s machine learning. 193
Licensors can also include confidentiality and data security restrictions to
buttress their rights.

A human may be held liable for the actions of a robot that he owns—such as autonomous
cars— “as their actions can be traced back to ‘programmer commands.’” . . . Where the
person controlling the robot can reasonably expect the robot to create a certain product or
to malfunction in a certain way, then all actions in that range revert back to the person
through said agency construct. If, however, the robot’s actions are outside that range of
expectation, just as one cannot predict the random music that is created by wind chimes,
then the “software agency” theory cannot apply. . . . I agree with the view that is expressed
by Grimmelmann, regarding the possibility of assigning liability to cases involving robotic
readership.
Khoury, supra note 160, at 649–50.
190. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 102 at 712 (“It makes sense to incentivize people or firms as
well as other entities to use creative AI systems to create works of authorship because doing so will
most efficiently promote the proliferation of the devices and the works they produce.”).
191. Hristov, supra note 169, at 450 (“Unlike human authors who have a limited lifespan, AI
programs could perpetually exist. This challenges the predetermined term of copyright protection
given to authors (life of author plus 70 years in the U.S.)”).
192. This proposition is supporting by the following:
[S]econd, it avoids the problem of vesting legal rights in a machine, which we all know is
impracticable. . . . I’ll close by saying that because U.S. copyright law is grounded in the
protection of economic rather than moral rights, it’s not inconsistent with first principles
to recognize authorship in non-natural persons.) (the problem is to distinguish computer
users who are genuine authors from users who merely push a button. But this is not a
problem unique to computers . . . . The user who pushes a button on a music box to start
it playing is not an author; the user who pushes a button on a camera to take a photograph
is. Trying to allocate copyrights between computer programmer and computer user is the
same kind of task as trying to allocate them between thing-maker and thing-user.
Bridy, supra note 104, at 400–01.
193. Emily Rich, AI: Who Owns the Output?, FRESHFIELDS DIGITAL (Aug. 24, 2018),
http://digital.freshfields.com/post/102f11c/ai-who-owns-the-output [http://perma.cc/H8K8-C3RG].
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Other common law countries appear to share this pragmatic
approach. 194 In contrast, civil law countries in the Western Hemisphere
are hindered by a copyright transfixed on the moral rights-basis of the
human author. 195 As a result, these jurisdictions “require an inseparable
nexus between human creativity and the resulting work.” 196 The
pragmatic nature of U.S. copyright policy has given it a competitive
advantage providing a haven for global AI investments. It would be
prudent to capitalize on it.
Of course, ownership issues will arise for which WFH will not be the
right answer. In the case of GAN, for instance, Robbie Barrat, a 17-yearold, created the software code and uploaded it to GitHub, a code-sharing
platform for others to download and use. 197 Many did, including the
creators of the Belamy portrait. In this case, the author and owner of the
work will be the same as a work created on Word or PowerPoint—the one
who created it, not Microsoft or Barrat. In these instances, the machine
merely provides the means of expressing the author’s expressive vision,
but it has not displaced the author. 198 Licensed users who create the
document and slides, or who select the data and train the AI, own the fruits
of their effort apart from the ones who provided the platform to execute
their work. 199
The foregoing discussion addresses authorship and ownership issues
arising out of AI-generated works. Other important issues copyright law
must resolve include how copyright law should treat training data and

194. See, e.g., New Zealand copyright law expressly defines and protects computer-generated
works and vests ownership of copyright in the “person by whom the arrangements necessary for the
creation of the work are undertaken.” Other common law countries—for example, the United
Kingdom, Hong Kong, and India—take the same approach.
195. Bridy, supra note 104, at 401 (“Maybe not surprisingly, civil law countries with a strong
moral rights orientation in their copyright systems—for example, France, Germany, Greece,
Switzerland, and Hungary - reject the notion of non-human authorship completely.”).
196. This relationship between the WFH doctrine and civil law system has been described in
the following way:
Civil law systems in the droit d’auteur tradition, with a strong moral rights orientation (like
French and German law), require an inseparable nexus between human creativity and the
resulting work. . . . The ‘work- made-for-hire’ doctrine . . . [is] in stark contrast to any
system based on a droit moral understanding. Without a radical policy shift such ideas are
not reconcilable with the majority of European national systems.
Schönberger, supra note 57.
197. Flynn, supra note 10.
198. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
199. Levendowski, supra note 84, at 592 (“[T]raining data must be well-selected by humans—
training data infused with implicit bias can result in skewed datasets that fuel both false positives and
false negatives.”).
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what the relevance of AI may be in copyright enforcement. These issues
are dealt with next.
B.

AI as Readers

The 15,000 portraits used to create GAN’s portrait at Christie’s is
something collectors might pay a king’s ransom to assemble. For GAN,
however, the portraits are just sets of data, much like scans of brain tumors
or emails that machines read without regard to aesthetic, cultural, or
historical value of the actual content. Similarly, deep-learning AI such as
Flow Machine, IBM Watson Beat, Google Magenta, and Spotify’s
Creator Technology Research Lab feature software that is fed source
material from contemporary hits to classics, which they analyze to find
patterns in chords, tempo, and length, learning from these inputs to write
their own melodies. 200
Most machine learning requires input datasets, which typically
requires making digital copies of the data. 201 Existing works are fed into
the system to train it. Once trained, the algorithm can create a work that
is influenced by the input works. One commentator noted that “[i]n the
near future, a machine learning library may become a standard part of all
operating systems, just like [transmission control protocols/Internet
protocols] and database technologies have in the past.” 202 A future where
neural networks allow AI to operate without hard-coding to sort through
data may be on the horizon.
Whether permission is needed to train the AI access data is an
important issue, because using it is presumptively copyright infringement
unless excused by fair use. In a milieu where the training set consists of a
200. Dani Deahl, How AI-Generated Music Is Changing The Way Hits Are Made, VERGE (Aug.
31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/artificial-intelligence-taryn-southernamper-music [http://perma.cc/NBU7-S6J2].
201. See, e.g., Scott Draves, Evolution and Collective Intelligence of the Electric Sheep, in THE
ART OF ARTIFICIAL EVOLUTION: A HANDBOOK ON EVOLUTIONARY ART AND MUSIC 63 (2007)
(describing an AI that “reproduces” images given higher scores by humans); Samuel Himel & Robert
Seamans, Artificial Intelligence, Incentives to Innovate, and Competition Policy, COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/CPI-Himel-Seamans.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9FY-ERZE] (“Large datasets
are a critical input for firms that want to create or use AI systems. Even the best AI algorithms are
useless without an underlying large-scale dataset, because large datasets are needed for the initial
training and fine-tuning of these algorithms.”); Sobel, supra note 84, at 61 (“Some input datasets are
assembled by digitizing physical media. Others are made by copying and processing born-digital data
like ebooks and news photographs.”).
202. Michael Borella, The Subject Matter Eligibility of Machine Learning: An Early Take,
PATENT DOCS (Sep. 23, 2018), http://www.patentdocs.org/2018/09/the-subject-matter-eligibility-ofmachine-learning-an-early-take.html [http://perma.cc/9JPG-TKSR].
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myriad of works, the same sort of hold-ups that have been seen in the
smartphone industry with patents might happen here too. 203 How
copyright law treats the use of these datasets will determine whether AIgenerated works can reliably develop without a constant threat of
litigation. 204 If the threat precipitates into copyright liability, it could
debilitate even the mightiest company. 205 A registered work entitles its
owner to statutory damages from $750 to $150,000 per copy per work,
which when multiplied by the thousands of works that typically make up
a training dataset could result in devastating costs. 206
As a matter of policy, copyright protection exists “to expand public
knowledge and understanding . . . by giving potential creators exclusive
control over copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive
to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public
consumption.” 207 Thus, “while authors are undoubtedly important
intended beneficiaries of copyright, the ultimate, primary intended
beneficiary is the public, whose access to knowledge copyright seeks to
203. Elise De Geyter, Inside Views: The Dilemma of Fair Use and Expressive Machine
Learning: An Interview with Ben Sobel, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2017/08/23/dilemma-fair-use-expressive-machine-learning-interview-bensobel/ [http://perma.cc/663K-MZ6E].
204. The threat of copyright litigation based on data sets has been described in the following
way:
If those input data contain copyrighted materials that the engineers are not authorized to
copy, then reproducing them is a prima facie infringement of § 106(1) of the Copyright
Act. If the data are modified in preprocessing, this may give rise to an additional claim
under § 106(2) for creating derivative works. In addition to copyright interests in the individual works within a dataset, there may be a copyright interest in the dataset as a whole.
Sobel, supra note 84, at 61
205. The consequences of copyright litigation over datasets has been described in the following
way:
This outcome would be devastating because the remedies that copyright law offers are
mismatched with the harms an author would suffer from inclusion in input data. . . . Because machine learning datasets can contain hundreds of thousands or millions of works,
an award of statutory damages could cripple even a powerful company.
Sobel, supra note 84, at 80.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018). The remedies available for copyright infringement include the
following:
If the work in question were registered prior to the infringement, the author could claim
statutory damages of at least $750 per infringed work, and up to $150,000 per work if the
infringement were deemed willful. . . . Conceivably, a plaintiff could enjoin a defendant
from proceeding with a machine learning operation, though it is unlikely that a court would
offer such a drastic equitable remedy in a case involving input data.
Sobel, supra note 84, at 80.
207. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (“This objective is clearly
reflected in the Constitution’s empowerment of Congress ‘To promote the Progress of Science . . . by
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings. ‘ U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.”).
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advance by providing rewards for authorship.” 208 It is trite that giving
authors control over all forms of exploitation of their works could limit
public knowledge. 209 The fair use defense thus permits unauthorized
copying to further “copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.’” 210 But the defendant who asserts fair use as
an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof. 211
In determining fair use, courts have distinguished between what
commentators have called expressive and non-expressive uses. 212 This
distinction recognizes that copyright primarily protects authors from acts
of expressive substitution through controlling the diffusion of the work to
the public: it has never been about regulating access to or use of the
works. 213 Non-expressive fair use recognizes that copyright protects the
author’s expression but not the facts about their work.
Non-expressive fair use allowed reverse engineering of game
cartridges to facilitate interoperability. 214 Non-expressive fair use also
allowed the production of thumbnail images to facilitate Internet searches,
going a step further than source code; here, expressive elements were
copied and presented to the public in miniaturized form. 215 Non-

208. Id.
209. Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (1802) (“‘[W]hile I shall think myself bound to
secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.’”).
210. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 8, cl. 8); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) provides:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
211. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir.1994).
212. See generally Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1607 (2009).
213. Id.
214. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Accolade’s
“intermediate copying” of Sega games was fair use, because it was necessary to gain access to the
“functional requirements for Genesis compatibility”—a functional element of Sega’s games ineligible
for copyright protection); Sobel, supra note 84, at 52 (“This ruling set the precedent that the
unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works, if incidental to a non-expressive purpose, was noninfringing fair use.”).
215. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The thumbnails do
not stifle artistic creativity because they are not used for illustrative or artistic purposes and therefore
do not supplant the need for the originals.”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,
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expressive fair use enabled Google to scan over 20 million books to power
its search engine for snippets of both copyrighted and uncopyrighted
books even though that use might harm authors’ “potential market.” 216
More recently, a district court found probative the fact that while a
photograph contained “creative elements (such as lighting and shutter
speed choices),” it was “also a factual depiction of a real-world location”
and the use was “purely for its factual content,” to provide a depiction of
the neighborhood photographed. 217 Copyright jurisprudence thus
recognizes the transformative nature of these uses, distinguishing them
from expressive uses which encroach upon the markets where the
copyright owner is foreseeably active.
With AI, machine learning is transformative and does not harm to
foreseeable markets for works used non-expressively. Datasets used to
train facial recognition AI, for instance, do not depend on the artistic
choices made by the photographers. Rather, they focus on “matching facts
of the subject’s identity with facts about their physical appearance.” 218
Beyond the purposes of tagging people in Facebook posts and ensuring
security, they are also used for payor authentication. 219 AI performing
facial recognition requires several thousand photographs of individuals.
The Labelled Faces in the Wild (LFW) database contains over 3,000
images from about 6,000 people featured in news pictures on Yahoo

1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Google Image Search repurposed images into “pointer[s] directing
a user to a source of information” as part of an “electronic reference tool[,]” rather than aesthetic
objects).
216. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Google Books
provided information “about” books, not the books’ expression. Even though “snippet view” shows
users the textual expression that surrounds a search term, it nevertheless furthers Google’s
transformative purpose by contextualizing a term’s usage within a book without revealing enough
expression to “threaten the author’s copyright interests.”). The significance of the Authors Guild
decision has been described in the following way:
Authors Guild is notable because it deploys the logic of non-expressive use to circumscribe
the “potential market” for a copyrighted work—among the most important factors in fair
use analysis—in a way that the image search cases do not. . . . In contrast, Authors Guild
explicitly notes that Google Books may well harm authors’ markets, but such harms “will
generally occur in relation to interests that are not protected by the copyright.” . . . A
Google Books user interested in a single historical fact may encounter that fact in snippet
view and, as a consequence, may decide not to procure an authorized copy from a
bookstore or library. Google Books therefore might harm an author’s market by deterring
these purchasers.
Sobel, supra note 84, at 55
217. Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, No. 1-17-CV-01009, 2018 WL 2921089, at *2
(E.D. Va. June 11, 2018).
218. Geyter, supra note 203.
219. Marr, supra note 84.
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News. 220 The low-resolution photographs are cropped tightly around the
subject’s face. Most of what is expressive is removed, leaving only a
physical likeness of the subject. The LFW database may not even invoke
fair use if what is taken is minimal.
Even if what is taken is expressive, the granularity in those snippets
and their functional use in matching rather than their aesthetic value is
quintessential non-expressive use. Copyright owners’ interests extend
only to the protected aspect of their works. With LFW, the focus is on
physical features in the photographs rather than photographers’ expressive
choices, and the output is matching data rather than expressive work.
Since LFW cannot create copyrightable work, it cannot misappropriate
work either. Considered individually, the bits of expression on which
LFW is trained are of infinitesimal value in comparison to the resulting
transformative use. As to potential market harm, training a facial
recognition model does not engage with copyright-protected aspects of
those images; thus, a market for images “qua facial recognition input data
is unlikely to be a market over which copyright affords rights holders a
monopoly.” 221
As datasets used to produce AI-generated work evolves from nonexpressive uses such as facial recognition to clearly expressive uses in
producing GAN-type paintings, fair use analysis becomes
correspondingly more controversial. AI producing commercially valuable
art, prose, or music trained on copyrighted works chafes uncomfortably
against interests that normally attract infringement liability if done by
humans. An example is Google’s Smart Reply AI. Smart Reply generates
three responses to emails instead of requiring users to compose responses
themselves. 222 Its training data includes emails from Gmail accounts 223 as

220. Sobel, supra note 84, at 67 (“Because they correspond to fifteen year old news stories, it is
safe to assume that most, if not all, of these images were created recently enough that they remain
copyright protected.”).
221. Sobel, supra note 84, at 76.
222. Anjuli Kannan et al., Smart Reply: Automated Response Suggestion for Email, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY
AND
DATA MINING
955–64
(2016),
http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/
2940000/2939801/p955kannan.pdf?ip=151.181.66.30&id=2939801&acc=OA&key=4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4D4702B0
C3E38B35%2E4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E5945DC2EABF3343C&__acm__=1554570524_27cee11
6e76108b6ba3aa07a25fc8798 [https://perma.cc/5KMH-7NLN] (describing how Smart Reply uses
machine learning to generate up to three responses to the emails which users can select instead of
composing replies themselves and how the Smart Reply research team manipulated “the most
frequent anonymized sentences” to train AI to express the same intention in different words, while
avoiding redundant suggestions).
223. Id. (describing how the Smart Reply algorithm was trained on 238 million email messages).
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well as novels to enable it to “generate coherent novel sentences” that
make Smart Reply more conversational. 224 Both the input and the output
in this example are expressive. As one commentator protested, “Google
sought to make use of authors’ varied and rich expression of ideas. This
is the essence of copyrightable subject matter. Google’s use cannot be
called non-expressive; no longer is the company merely providing facts
about books or furnishing a reference tool.” 225
At the same time, the use is clearly functional—to respond to and
correspond with the sender of the email, rather than supplant a market for
the emails or novels used as training data. 226 Smart Reply merely analyzes
“the basic building blocks and patterns of human language,” which are
“entirely within the public domain.” 227 The text does not transpose any of
the expressive elements in the training data, whether those data are from
its users, non-Gmail users, or the authors of novels used to train the
dataset. Further, the expression in single email exchanges from the Smart
Reply training dataset is of interest only to the parties. In contrast, Smart
Reply could save time and effort for a myriad of Gmail users. The idea
that authors of emails or novels foresee a market for their emails seems
fanciful. 228
In the context of using datasets to train AI-generated works, allowing
non-expressive fair uses while prohibiting expressive fair uses sets up a

224. Samuel R. Bowman et al., Generating Sentences from a Continuous Space, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH SIGNLL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTATIONAL NATURAL LANGUAGE
LEARNING
10-21
(May
12,
2016),
https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/K16-1,
[https://perma.cc/6MUK-KE9A]; Alex Kantrowitz, Google Is Feeding Romance Novels To Its
Artificial Intelligence Engine To Make Its Products More Conversational, BUZZFEEDNEWS (May 5,
2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexkantrowitz/googles-artificial-intelligence-enginereads-romance-novels [https://perma.cc/BX79-PCBG] (describing using the BookCorpus dataset to
train AI to “generate coherent novel sentences” that could make Smart Reply more conversational);
Richard Lea, Google swallows 11,000 novels to improve AI’s conversation, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/sep/28/google-swallows-11000-novels-toimprove-ais-conversation [https://perma.cc/LG94-ZXZA] (reporting that some of the novels were
unauthorized copies of copyrighted works and that the authors were not notified, credited, or
compensated for Google’s use of their works).
225. Sobel, supra note 84, at 69.
226. Lea, supra note 226 (reporting a Google spokesman defending the move since it “doesn’t
harm the authors and is done for a very different purpose from the authors’, so it’s fair use under US
law,” and that romance novels made good input data because they “frequently repeated the same
ideas, so the model could learn many ways to say the same thing—the language, phrasing and
grammar in fiction books tends [sic] to be much more varied and rich than in most nonfiction books”).
227. Schönberger, supra note 59.
228. Sobel supra note 84, at 75 (“Even when input data comprise conventional ‘works’ . . . it
still seems ridiculous to compare those works’ value to that of a machine learning model that powers
an innovative web service.”).
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false dichotomy about the kind of progress the law should privilege. 229
That human creativity can thrive only by fending off machine competition
overlooks capabilities that allowed humans to survive and flourish
throughout history. To encourage such advances, investors need clear
rules incentivizing both artistic and technological progress, not a
reductionist approach that stifles one to protect the other. 230
As with WFH, civil law countries do not enjoy the flexible policy
lever that fair use offers users of copyrighted works in the U.S.231 The
U.S. would be foolish not to use all that fair use has to offer to its
advantage and supercharge the growth of AI-generated works. And there
is another reason to do so. Bias in AI may be exacerbated by a restrictive
fair use doctrine. Where training data is protected by copyright, those who
use them do so secretly, preventing biases from being uncovered. 232
229. The impact of permissive fair use on AI has been described in the following way:
Permissive fair use for machine learning would undeniably foster progress in the scientific
field of artificial intelligence. It might also foster a certain kind of artistic progress. Unencumbered by copyright, AI could learn from all the greatest books, movies, and music.
Perhaps this erudite AI would become so adept at making art as to supersede human creativity. . . . Human creators, in turn, might not derive any incentives from copyright law if
robotic rivals undercut their earning potential. If robotic creators gave the public access to
more, and better, works of art than any human artistic establishment could deliver—and,
in so doing, marginalized the human artistic establishment—would that be the progress
copyright law exists to promote?
Sobel, supra note 84, at 89. See also, Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and
the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 329 (2017) (distinguishing
between “accumulationist” accounts of progress and a “pragmatist aesthetics” of progress, and
“focuses not on the stockpiling over time of fixed, archivable works but rather on the quality of
ephemeral aesthetic experience in the present. . . . [P]ragmatist aesthetics measures aesthetic progress
(or regress) largely by the extent of popular, democratic participation in aesthetic practice.”).
230. Reductionism has been described in the following way:
Reductionism refers to the theory that the behaviour of a system is the sum of the behaviour of its smaller and simpler constituent parts. Reductionism is reflected in the propensity of organisations, including governments, to break down large problems into smaller
problems so that aspects of national security, for example, are dealt with separately by the
ministries of defence, home affairs and foreign affairs. But this approach is inadequate for
dealing with complex — or wicked — problems like terrorism or climate change, which
require collaboration across bureaucratic silos because the resources and expertise for
dealing with them reside in more than one agency.
PETER HO, THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE IN A COMPLEX WORLD (Sandhya Venkatesh ed.,
2018).
231. Schönberger, supra note 57 (“Unfortunately, the detour via the fair use doctrine is a luxury
that European law does not offer. . . . Instead the InfoSoc Directive provides for a rigid system of
exclusive rights (including a ‘reproduction right’) with an exhaustive list of exceptions and
limitations.”).
232. See Louise Matsakis, Copyright Law Makes Artificial Intelligence Bias Worse,
MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 31 2017), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/59ydmx/copyright-lawartificial-intelligence-bias [http://perma.cc/3DKE-WZMP] (“If training an AI were classified as fair
use in most cases, computer scientists would be free to use any work to teach their algorithms. They
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The machine-centric nature of innovation and creativity warps the
usual rules incentivizing the two. However, uncertainty should not
unsettle us. As Charles Darwin recognized, uncertainty is a necessary precondition for change and adaptation. 233 If AI can learn from the greatest
books, movies, and music we have to offer and create work that
supersedes what has come before, how is that not both technological and
aesthetic progress? Some outclassed human creators will find their
livelihoods challenged if they are unwilling or unable to retrain, retool,
and use AI to augment their work to remain relevant. Still, that challenge
is not peculiar to creators of copyrighted work.
It is a challenge that receptionists, taxi drivers, and factory workers
face in the 4IR even as they themselves have replaced the professions that
went before them. Even attorneys reviewing agreements have been
outclassed by LawGeex, a machine learning AI. 234 Twenty lawyers from
firms such as Goldman Sachs, Cisco, Alston & Bird, and K&L Gates
tasked with reviewing nondisclosure agreements for potential risks were
given four hours to study the contracts. They took an average of 92
minutes and exhibited an 85% accuracy rate. The same task took
LawGeex 26 seconds to complete with 94% accuracy. This is good news
for lawyers who can move beyond drudge work, passing cost savings to
consumers who can access cheaper legal services. The future of legal
practice lies in reskilling, not in chasing after skills that technology will
soon make redundant.
It is worth considering instances where fair use need not be invoked
at all. First, the copy may be too ephemeral to constitute infringement. To
be infringing, the alleged infringer must have fixed a copy of the
copyrighted work. 235 Ephemeral copies are so fleeting that they are not
considered copies at all. 236 Second, trendlines in headlines indicate that
AI-generated works may soon use very small datasets. Cognitive
scientists are developing algorithms to mimic more elusive aspects of the

could also disclose what they used without fear of legal repercussion.”); see also Levendowski, supra
note 84; see Daryl Lim, Predictive Analytics: How Behavioral Economics & Artificial Intelligence
can Bridge the Intellectual Property-Antitrust Divide (forthcoming 2019) (discussing how bias affects
the IP-antitrust interface).
233. Lim, supra note 234.
234. Cal Jeffrey, Machine-learning algorithm beats 20 lawyers in NDA legal analysis,
TECHSPOT (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.techspot.com/news/77189-machine-learning-algorithmbeats-20-lawyers-nda-legal.html [http://perma.cc/EMN8-H4XC].
235. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657 (2d Cir. 2018).
236. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that movies and television programs streamed through a data buffer for 1.2 seconds did not
create copies under the Copyright Act).
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human mind using probabilistic techniques and a small dataset. 237 Uber’s
AI lab is working on AI that mimics evolution by starting with a set of
random algorithms. Developers choose one that suits the task at hand and
generates derivative algorithms, eventually arriving at one most
appropriate for the job. This serendipitous approach to problem solving
can yield results that goal-driven optimization cannot. 238 MIT researchers
developed software that can recognize objects using nothing more than
raw images and audio files. 239 These may render the copyright
infringement issue moot at least in a small number of cases. Before
concluding our discussion on the implications of AI on copyright law, it
is worth briefly considering the role of AI in enforcement.
C.

AI as Enforcers

AI can also detect copyright infringement, such as in photos used on
websites, by looking for a certain image. 240 As the recent Blurred Lines
lawsuit shows, infringement hinges on proving that a songwriter copied
from an older work, which can be difficult to determine because humans
may be subliminally influenced. 241 In that case, the majority held that
musical compositions exist on a broad range of expression with a large
array of elements. 242 This was severely criticized by the dissent. 243 A core
point of contention was expert testimony offered by the plaintiff’s music
expert, who the dissent excoriated because she “cherry-picked brief

237. Knight, supra note 41 (describing programs than recognize new handwritten characters and
images after just seeing a few examples).
238. A sense of curiosity is helpful for artificial intelligence, ECONOMIST (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2018/08/30/a-sense-of-curiosity-is-helpful-forartificial-intelligence [http://perma.cc/JWF6-BWJ3] (“Biological evolution was not explicitly curious
about flying, and yet it still managed to come up with birds.”).
239. Timothy B. Lee, AI learns to decipher images based on spoken words—almost like a
toddler, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 23, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/09/ai-learns-todecipher-images-based-on-spoken-words-almost-like-a-toddler/ [http://perma.cc/C4MN-XT5E].
240. Houstonlawy3r, Neural Network Applications to Image Copyright Infringement,
CASHMAN IP (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.cashmanip.com/neural-network-image-copyright/
[https://perma.cc/KW87-GNCS] (“From there images across the internet can be searched using
Logistic Regression to determine which images likely infringe the copyrighted image.”).
241. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
242. Id. at 1120.
243. The dissent’s criticism of the majority included:
The majority allows the Gayes to accomplish what no one has before: copyright a musical
style. “Blurred Lines” and “Got to Give It Up” are not objectively similar. They differ in
melody, harmony, and rhythm. Yet by refusing to compare the two works, the majority
establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future musicians and
composers everywhere.
Id. at 1138 (Nugyen, J., dissenting).
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snippets to opine that a ‘constellation’ of individually unprotectable
elements in both pieces of music made them substantially similar.” 244 AI
trained on a dataset of “the building blocks of melody, harmony, and
rhythm” would be able to digest and empower courts to make better
decisions in the same way that AI has helped prognosticate disease as seen
in Part II. It may also be used to parse through the paper-trail by which
other AIs generate their works. With an AI, the scope of training datasets
is finite, and copying is evidentially easier to prove through audio-finger
printing and analysis. 245
Like the creative arts, AI will continue to play an ever more
prominent role in artistic and technological progress. Companies are
increasingly reliant on AI to generate, simulate, and evaluate test results.
They function more quickly and efficiently than their human agents while
minimizing constraints put in place by human biases or time. 246 As seen
in Part II.C, AI can also combine prior art across diverse fields in
nonobvious and creative ways. With respect to patent practice, the use of
AI in search and examination will become increasingly more important to
the continued viability of the patent system. 247 These developments raise
novel and important questions for patent law, policy, and practice. These
issues will be considered next.
IV. AI & PATENTS
In 2018, Nature published an article about how AI is changing
discovery of novel drug compounds and structures of a variety of
diseases. 248 AI has also been used in diagnosing diseases, customizing
treatment, mapping genes in different cell categories, and creating virtual
animal and human models for drug tests. 249 The intersection of AI and
244. Id.
245. Dredge, supra note 99.
246. Fraser, supra note 44 (noting that AI has assisted in creating patentable inventions for
several decades, recent improvements to AI and exponential growth in computing power will likely
further enable computers to produce useful inventions and become major drivers of innovation in
fields like electronics, robotics, health and pharmaceuticals, materials, and nanotechnology).
247. Joff Wild, Artificial intelligence and the future of the patent system, IAM (July 11, 2018),
https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/artificial-intelligence-and-future-patent-system
[http://perma.cc/QZ56-PVMS] (“These issues . . . challenge the utility of the patent system. If not
addressed, they could potentially devalue it and lead to decline in its use. There is simply way too
much data for a human to read, analy[z]e and understand. It is clear we need help. Step up artificial
intelligence (AI).”).
248. Nic Fleming, How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing Drug Discovery, 557 NATURE S55
(May 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05267-x1 [http://perma.cc/FP29-VVZU].
249. Grantland Drutchas, Artificial IP: Can Drugs Discovered Using AI Be Patented?, CHI.
LAW. 76 (Oct. 2018).
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patent law raises important issues: What happens when the AI takes the
inventive step in producing the technological breakthrough? 250 Can a
novel drug identified by AI be “invented”? How should these
breakthroughs affect the regard for the notional person—the PHOSITA—
by which much of patent doctrine is measured? How does AI change the
equation when it comes to infringement? How can AI help save the patent
system from obsolescence? We consider these questions here.
A.

AI & Inventorship

The literature on AI and IP cites the “Creativity Machine” and the
“Invention Machine” as examples of AI creating patentable inventions. 251
It is striking that neither of the applicants identified the computers as the
inventors. Who owns a patent turns on who, as an initial matter, invented
the patent. Inventorship looks at who invented the subject matter of the
patent and refers to the individual who invented or discovered the subject
matter of the invention. 252 An inventor must conceive the invention 253 but
need not reduce it to practice. 254 Conception is the “formation in the mind
of the inventor, of a deﬁnite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.” 255
The issue of ownership, or who owns legal title to the subject matter
claimed in the patent, is starker in patent law than in copyright. 256 Because
patent law has no equivalent of WFH, individual inventors need to
expressly assign their inventions to their employers for corporate
ownership of inventions. It follows that with regard to patent law, unlike
copyright law, the absence of a human inventor to bridge the chain of
250. Toby Bond, How Artificial Intelligence is set to disrupt our legal framework for
Intellectual Property rights, IPWATCHDOG (June 18, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/06/18/artificial-intelligence-disrupt-legal-framework-intellectual-property-rights/id=84319/
[http://perma.cc/T248-69DY] (noting that AI will be the entity taking the inventive step, drawing new
conclusions between the observed and the unknown).
251. U.S. Patent No. 5,852,815 (filed May 15, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 6,857,851 (filed Jan. 16,
2003).
252. Mark D. Penner and Mark Vanderveke, Could the Creations of Artificial Intelligence be
(June
27,
2018),
Entitled
to
Intellectual
Property
Protection?,
FASKEN
https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledgehub/2018/06/could-the-creations-of-artificial-intelligence-beentitled-to-intellectual-property-protection [http://perma.cc/3D97-X5L8] (an “inventor” is defined as
the individual who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention).
253. MPEP § 2137.01 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) (“Unless a person contributes to the conception
of the invention, he is not an inventor.”).
254. Id. (reduction to practice may be satisfied either when the invention is actually carried out
and is found to work for its intended purpose, or when a patent application having a sufficient
disclosure is filed); see also Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
255. See Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897).
256. Vapor Point LLC v. Moorhead, 832 F.3d 832 (2016).
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inventorship and ownership between machine and corporation becomes
critical.
In the absence of an assignment, the original applicant is presumed
to be the owner. 257 A human or corporate assignee of the invention could
be recognized as the applicant and own the resulting patent, but this
presupposes that a computer has the legal capacity to assign property,
which it does not. This may create an impetus to introduce WFH to patent
law similar to what currently exists under copyright law. That should not
be radical. Their headwaters are the same—the IP Clause of the
Constitution confers limited exclusive rights to promote artistic and
technological progress. It is trite that while the streams of copyright and
patent law mostly run parallel, they sometimes intermingle, and ideas
cross-pollinate across their banks. 258
It is unlikely, though, that an AI can qualify as an inventor under
current law. Conception can be performed only by natural persons
because AI has no mind to speak of. This conclusion is buttressed by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of patent-eligible subject matter as
“anything under the sun that is made by man.” 259 The Dictionary Act
provides that “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress . . .
the [word] . . . ‘individual,’ shall include every infant member of the
species homo sapiens.” 260 It is true that on its face, person and whoever
may not be limited to humans or individuals since these terms could
include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies. Further, no true infant is capable of
inventing anything potentially patentable. One conclusion may be that
person or individual would, in and of themselves, preclude AI from being
recognized as an inventor. At the same time, patent law expressly vests
ownership rights initially in human inventors, not companies. 261 The
anchoring of inventorship to the human inventor stems from a desire to

257. 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018) (referring to the “applicant” as the inventor).
258. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2017) (“The two share
a ‘strong similarity and identity of purpose,’ and many everyday products . . . are subject to both
patent and copyright protections.”).
259. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
260. 1 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2018).
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2018) (stating that the U.S. patent system only recognizes
individuals as inventors); see New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (stating that inventors cannot be companies); Ben Hattenback & Joshua Glucoft, Patents
in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 46 (2015)
(stating that inventors cannot be machines); see also, C. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent
Cases, 10 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 433, 438 (1966) (noting that the prevalent
view is that a new patentable concept is a “mental creation by a human being”).
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recognize and reward human ingenuity apart from economic benefit
derived from the disclosure of the patented invention. 262
The Patent Act states that “[p]atentability shall not be negated by the
manner in which the invention was made.” 263 However, that section deals
specifically with the nonobviousness enquiry and, in particular, suggests
that hindsight should not be used in determining whether the invention
was obvious. 264 It would be a stretch to negate case law and statutory law
indicating the need for a human agent in the inventive process, including
both conceiving of the invention and reducing it to practice. Thus, unlike
copyright law where WFH specially recognizes corporations as the
author-owner, a human must in the first instance be named as an inventor
with regard to patentability—at least for now. 265
Beyond the question of vesting rights in the AI itself, inventorship
issues may still arise. The list of possible human inventors includes the
hardware and software developers, data trainers, and anyone who
recognized the significance of AI-generated results. 266 For instance, if A
develops an AI and assigns it to B, who operates the AI on a cloud server
provided by C, using training data provided by D, and the AI produces an
invention—who is the inventor? Joint inventorship springs from a
significant contribution to the conception of the invention such that a
person of ordinary skill in the art could construct the invention without
unduly extensive research or experimentation. 267 A collaborator who
contributes to the conception of just a single claim may be a joint
262. Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of
Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 585 (2002) (arguing that human
creativity should be encouraged and recognized as underpins popular and political support for the
patent system); see also Graham Dutfield, Collective Invention and Patent Law Individualism:
Origins and Functions of the Inventor’s Right of Attribution, 5 WIPO J. 25, 25–26 (2013),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/wipo_journal/wipo_journal_5_1.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/8ESE-DCFQ] (noting that human inventorship recognizes the value placed on the
products of human minds and the individuals who produce them).
263. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
264. See Ashley Allman Bolt, Combating Hindsight Reconstruction in Patent Prosecution, 64
EMORY L.J. 1137 (2015).
265. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that
“only natural persons may be ‘inventors’”).
266. Tull, supra note 76, at 42 (“The list of possible human inventors includes the AI software
and hardware developers, the medical professionals or experts who provided the data set with known
values or otherwise provided input into the development of the AI, and/or those who reviewed the AI
results and recognized that an invention had been made.”).
267. In re Verhoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (A joint inventor may “contribute . . .
to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention.”); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135
F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co.,
973 F.2d 911, 917 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that each joint inventor must generally contribute to the
conception of the invention); Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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inventor, 268 and each joint inventor need not equally contribute. 269 At the
same time, a collaborator must “make a contribution to the claimed
invention that is not insignificant in quality, when . . . measured against
the dimension of the full invention,” and “do more than merely explain to
the real inventors well-known concepts and/or the current state of the
art.” 270 In the previous example, B and D arguably satisfy the requirement
of joint inventorship if D’s employees selected the data and B fed the data
in to discover the invention. 271 So may A and C, though the assignment
and hosting make their claims to the invention more tenuous.
The law assumes that the named inventors “are the true and only
inventors.” 272 Inventorship on issued patents is presumed to be correct,
and a challenger must prove its case by “clear and convincing evidence”
and provide corroborating evidence. 273 When an inventor is not named on
an issued patent or a person is named in error, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) may correct inventorship.274 If inventorship can
be corrected, then the error will not render the patent invalid. 275 A court
may also order correction of inventorship, but an omitted inventor who
moves for correction must meet a “heavy burden.” 276
There are perils to not naming the correct inventors. First, the PTO
may reject claims where an application does not correctly name all
inventors. 277 Second, patent applicants who intentionally falsify
inventorship to the PTO risk invalidation of any issued patent based on
inequitable conduct. 278 Third, patentees seeking to enforce their rights
268. Ethicon, Inc., 135 F.3d at 1460.
269. In re Verhoef, 888 F.3d at 1366.
270. Id.
271. Jason Lohr, Artificial intelligence drives new thinking on patent rights, HOGAN LOVELLS:
LIMEGREEN IP NEWS (July 15, 2016), https://www.limegreenipnews.com/2016/07/artificialintelligence-drives-new-thinking-on-patent-rights/ [http://perma.cc/42R7-ZH3Q].
272. Drone Techs. v. Parrot S.A., 838 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
273. Vapor Point LLC v. Moorhead, 832 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub
nom, Nanovapor Fuels Grp., Inc. v. Vapor Point, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1121 (2017) (leaving in place an
order by the lower court to correct inventorship based on clear and convincing evidence that two joint
inventors were omitted).
274. 35 U.S.C. § 256(a) (2018).
275. 35 U.S.C. § 256(b) (2018).
276. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
277. In re Verhoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTO’s rejection of
claims under pre-AIA § 102(f) because the applicant did not name his co-inventor on the application,
reasoning that the applicant did not conceive of every claim); MPEP § 2157 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan.
2018) (Although the AIA version of § 102 does not include a subsection (f) or contain the same
language as pre-AIA § 102(f), the PTO has indicated it will continue to reject errors of inventorship
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115 (2018)).
278. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (“To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must prove that the
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might have their suits dismissed for nonjoinder if a court determines that
the patent does not name all joint inventors. 279 Moreover, as with WFH,
licenses, joint development agreements, and assignments need to reflect
clearly the parties’ intention in invention ownership, as do
indemnification agreements on liability.
Are patent applicants then trapped in a catch-22? AI cannot be named
as an inventor even though the human role may be minimal or nonexistent.
Yet listing a human inventor who made no actual conceptual contribution
could be misleading or even fraudulent. One option is to eliminate the
statutory requirement to identify an inventor altogether. The underlying
question then becomes who should own the invention. Furthermore, it
allows inventorship issues arising from a sliver of facts to trump the
benefit that naming inventors within an established and time-honored
system brings. 280
It may be better for AI to be identified in a patent application as long
as AI is used. Patent applications do not currently require applicants to
disclose the use of AI in the inventive process, much less that the AI
invented the invention. 281 This becomes particularly important when
identifying the PHOSITA in the AI-era, where the “person of ordinary
skill in the art” may no longer be a person at all. Identification of the
PHOSITA is centrally relevant to issues of patentability and patent scope.
For example, claim construction, novelty, and obviousness are all
determined from the PHOSITA’s point of view. The relevant standard

patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”); see also id. at 1292 (“[I]nequitable
conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent family) unenforceable.”); PerSeptive Biosys., Inc.
v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding asserted patents
unenforceable for inequitable conduct based on incorrect inventorship based on “at least five specific
instances of intentional falsehoods, misrepresentations, and omissions” directed to the material issue
of inventorship).
279. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that
“one co-owner has the right to impede the other co-owner’s ability to sue infringers by refusing to
voluntarily join in such a suit.”).
280. Fraser, supra note 44 (“[E]liminating this requirement would obviate certain justifications
for the patent system, such as the fair reward and moral benefit of recognition. This could have
tangible impacts on scientists and engineers who gain professional credibility and even monetary
benefits based on their status as a named inventor on patents.”).
281. Ana Ramalho, Patentability of AI-Generated Inventions: is a Reform of the Patent System
Needed?, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3168703, [https://perma.cc/W3HLMS6M] (“[N] either laws nor Examination Guidelines seem to mandate that the applicant indicate the
means through which she created the invention.”); id. (describing how the prosecution history of the
invention “Apparatus for Improved General-Purpose PID and non-PID Controllers” makes no
mention of the AI used to develop the invention, nor the use of the AI in developing his idea. The
inventor admitted that “the whole invention was created by a computer”).
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will vary widely depending on whether the inventor is the AI, the
augmented human user, or the AI developers.
B.

AI as the PHOSITA

An inventor cannot receive a patent for an invention that is only a
trivial or obvious modification of the prior art. 282 The obviousness inquiry
requires “a comparison between what is claimed to have been invented in
the patent and what was already known to a person of ordinary skill in the
field of art pertaining to the invention.” 283 Courts and the PTO apply a
three-step procedure: 284 (1) they determine the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) they compare the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue; and (3) they assess the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art. 285
In step one, the PHOSITA is presumed to have knowledge of all the
analogous prior art in addition to the ordinary skill of one who practices
in that area of technology. 286 Analogous art includes only those prior art
references that either arise in the same field of endeavor or deal with the
same problem the inventor has attempted to solve. 287 A reference may be
considered reasonably pertinent if:
it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically
would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering
his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the
claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that
fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. 288

Prior art that teaches away from the combination by suggesting its
undesirability or yielding unexpected results indicates the nonobviousness
of the invention. 289 In step two, because inventions consist of new
combinations of pre-existing elements, the sum of analogous prior art
must contain each element of the claimed invention as well as provide a
“motivation to combine” the references by the PHOSITA. 290 Prejudice
282. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
283. Securitypoint Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 25, 35 (2016).
284. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
285. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (The court may also assess secondary
considerations.).
286. See, e.g., In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
287. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
288. Sci. Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S.Ct. 2380 (2015).
289. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
290. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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from prior failures in the relevant art is an important factor in
nonobviousness analysis.
A PHOSITA that is either AI-augmented or an AI inventor can
thread non-analogous art and is unfettered by biases due to prior failures
is clearly superior to a PHOSITA fettered by the limitations of human
cognition. 291 An inventive step obvious to an AI capable of testing
millions of prototypes in a fraction of the time that a skilled artisan needs
may be staggeringly nonobvious to a skilled person, or moderately
obvious to that same person with access to a similar AI system. How
should patent law respond?
One option is to raise the bar for patentability by modifying the
criteria explicitly to require consideration of AI. 292 Professor Ryan Abbott
has argued that the PHOSITA should include an express consideration of
“technologies used by active workers.” 293 In particular,
[t]his change will more explicitly take into account the fact that machines are already augmenting the capabilities of workers, in essence
making more obvious and expanding the scope of prior art. Once inventive machines become the standard means of research in a field, the
test would also encompass the routine use of inventive machines by
skilled persons. . . .To obtain the necessary information to implement
this test, the Patent Office should establish a new requirement for applicants to disclose when a machine contributes to the conception of an
invention, which is the standard for qualifying as an inventor. 294

Another option is to exclude inventions that might have been created
even without the patent system. 295 To do so would create a subcategory of
patent rules for AI-inventions that risks arbitrariness and may be difficult
to cabin. Yet, what is the alternative?
After all, applicants need not declare to the PTO whether an AI was
involved in the inventive step. They can use the benchmark of a human
291. Ramalho, supra note 281 (“The use of AI in the inventing process can cause the field of
analogous arts to be broadened in practice, given the unbiased nature of AI (and therefore the real
possibility that AIs will look for solutions to problems in non-analogous fields).”); see also Ryan
Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 37 (2019) (“[A] machine is capable of accessing
a virtually unlimited amount of prior art. Advances in medicine, physics, or even culinary science
may be relevant to solving a problem in electrical engineering. Machine augmentation suggests that
the analogous arts test should be modified or abolished once inventive machines are common, and
that there should be no difference in prior art for purposes of novelty and obviousness.”).
292. Ramalho, supra note 283, at 26 (“It would therefore be advisable to consider adding a
‘made by AI’ factor as an indication of obviousness.”).
293. Abbott, supra note 293, at 6.
294. Abbott, supra note 293, at 6.
295. Abbott, supra note 293, at 45 (“inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for
the inducement of a patent.”).
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PHOSITA to show that their invention was nonobvious, but they cannot
have it both ways. Applicants can choose to (1) declare the AI’s
involvement and be judged by a higher AI-PHOSITA standard that would
render more things obvious or (2) not use AI and be bound by a lower
human-PHOSITA standard. Therein lies both the solution and the seeds
of the greedy applicant’s own destruction. If the patent specification fails
to enable the human PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention
without undue experimentation, the claim will be invalid for lack of
enablement. 296 Similarly, if the human PHOSITA cannot discern that the
inventor possessed the invention on the claim’s effective filing date, that
claim is invalid for failure to meet the written description requirement. 297
Finally, if the human PHOSITA reading the claims in light of the
specification and prosecution history cannot discern their objective
boundaries, the claims fail for lack of definiteness.298 This is because AI
systems often operate in a black box. 299 In this regard, using AI techniques
to explain AI functionality or locating an inventive concept outside the AI
interacting with other elements may ameliorate this obstacle.300
C.

AI as Infringers

IBM’s Watson AI is used in Aerialtronic drones, Under Armour’s
fitness apps, and Weather Underground’s weather prediction app. 301
Machine learning enables Watson to write new algorithms, and in that
process, infringe on patents that might not have been anticipated when the

296. 35 U.S.C. §112 (2018).
297. As to written description, “[t]he standard for satisfying the written description requirement
is whether the disclosure ‘allow[s] one skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity of the
subject matter purportedly described.’” Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs. Ltd., 745 F.3d 1180,
1190(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir.
2002)). The written description requirement demands that the specification fully support or describe
the invention claimed. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018) (“The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention.”).
298. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 911–12 (2014); see 35 U.S.C. §
112(b) (2018) (requiring that a claim must be sufficiently definite to inform the public of the bounds
of the protected invention, i.e., what subject matter is covered by the exclusive rights of the patent).
299. See Kaavo Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 630, 642 (D. Del. 2018) (rejecting
AI claims that gave “no details on how the forecasting is done, and no algorithm [wa]s provided”).
300. Danny Tobey, Alice in Wonderland: Navigating the Strange World of Patenting AI, AIPLA
NEWSSTAND (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=26fa0357-e1dd410b-aadf-c8903ede9807 [http://perma.cc/9PFP-QUBW].
301. Marc Ferranti, IBM’s Watson IoT Hits the Skies with Aerialtronics drone deal,
ComputerWorld, (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3121224/internet-ofthings/ibms-watson-iot-hits-the-skies-with-aerialtronics-dronedeal.html
[http://perma.cc/N7KWLGAP].
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initial iteration was developed. 302 Multiple actors may be involved in its
development and operation. This makes it difficult to determine which
party is liable should direct infringement occur.
AI-generated works might infringe preexisting rights of others in
several ways. First, the AI could perform steps recited in the claims of a
patented invention. A lens designed by AI could infringe patents on
optical lens and electrical circuit technology. 303 Similarly, AI-enabled
systems that map the fastest route between two points could ensnare both
the AI developer and the agent who implements the system under a direct
infringement theory where they cumulatively perform all the patented
steps. 304

302. Bridget Watson, A Mind of Its Own-Direct Infringement by Users of Artificial Intelligence
Systems, 58 IDEA: J. FRANKLIN PIERCE FOR INTELL. PROP. 65, 80 (2017) (“Through machine
learning, Watson can alter its own programming.”); see also id. at 81 (“The following fictitious
example demonstrates how infringement of a patent-protected method occurs. Weather Underground
uses Watson to make weather predictions. After multiple months of data evaluation, Watson develops
a new method of weather prediction and uses the new method in its subsequent predictions.”).
303. Id. at 76.
304. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) (Direct infringement occurs when a party “makes, uses, sells,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent.”). Here is one
infringement hypothetical:
For example, consider a patented method for determining the fastest route to a destination,
which considers traffic patterns, satellite data, and road conditions. Company A, the controlling company, creates and sells an artificial intelligence system to Company B, the
agent. Company B directs the system to better determine the fastest route to a destination
by inputting information from traffic patterns, satellite data, and road conditions. Using
the inputted information, the system identifies an approach for determining the fastest
route between two definitions, which happens to be the same method claimed in the patent.
By performing each step in the method for determining the fastest route between two destinations, the system, under B’s current control, infringed on the patent. Using the definition of direct infringement, this would constitute infringement of the patent.
Watson, supra note 304, at 78–79 (2017). A and B may also infringe where A contracts with B to
perform one or more steps in the claims, while A performed the rest of the steps:
For example, the system sold by Company A and bought by Company B is directed to
develop an algorithm for determining the fastest route to a destination. Company B directs
the system to perform steps one and two, which are identical to steps one and two from
the patent. The system then develops the remaining steps, identical to those of the patent.
Thus, Company B directing the system to develop the remaining steps would also constitute infringement under the definition of direct infringement.
Watson, supra note 304, at 79. The current interpretation of direct infringement has been described
in the following way:
Under the rule provided by the Federal Circuit in Akamai, direct infringement of a patentprotected method occurs when all of the steps are “performed or attributed to a single
entity. . . . Therefore, when an artificial intelligence system creates a method and implements that method to produce a result, infringement occurs if that method is patent-protected such that the system performs each and every step of the method claim.”
Watson, supra note 304, at 81.
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The 4IR also introduced an amplified likelihood of infringement
unknown in the biochemical industry until now. 305 Every step in the value
chain from invention to manufacturing, diagnosis, prescription, delivery,
and treatment could involve software. 306 In chemical industries involving
few technology layers, the invention is usually clearly identified by settled
terminology, and a thorough patent search can support a tolerably reliable
freedom to operate report. 307
In contrast, software exists in the messy realm of complex
cumulative technologies with overlapping rights over abstract
technologies described by non-standardized terminology. 308 The
relationship among rights owners is one of interlocking interdependence,

305. The increased likelihood of infringement has been described in the following way:
The digital transformation changes processes in companies, as well as their product and
service offerings across all industries. This creates a new IP management situation for
many companies, especially in traditional, risk-averse industries (e.g. chemicals and pharmaceuticals). . . . For companies doing business in traditional industry sectors with little
or no focus on information technology (IT) and computer technology, using new technologies imposed by the digital transformation leads to situations where the old paradigms of
exclusivity or freedom to operate no longer apply. Rather, IP risk management approaches
seem to be more appropriate.
Peter Bittner, Intellectual Property Management Challenges Arising from Pervasive Digitalisation:
The Effect of the Digital Transformation on Daily Life, in 5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL
TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA 67, 71-72 (2018),
http://www.i3pm.org/files/misc/CEIPI-ICTSD_Issue_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5FG-QJZ7].
306. Id. at 71 (“Production and logistics processes undergo disruptive digital redesigns enabled
by Internet of Things technologies and robotics. Even the innovation processes in companies change
dramatically by relying more and more on computer-aided innovation, with artificial intelligence
applications developing rapidly.”).
307. Alissa Zeller, Influences of Digital Transformation on Freedom-to-Operate Processes in
the Chemical Industry, in 5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA 75, 78 (2018), http://www.i3pm.org/files/misc/CEIPIICTSD_Issue_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5FG-QJZ7] (“For chemical products, a meaningful in-depth
FTO analysis can be done because of the clearly defined product (chemical formula) and the limited
number of patents per product. Both restrict the patent search and its analysis to a reasonable scope.”).
308. An example of this problem was described in the following way:
For example, when an innovation is made in the application layer (which is frequently the
case in the smart product context), a patent search may reveal other IP rights targeting
innovations in this layer. However, it is practically impossible to gain insights regarding
the IP situation in the lower levels of the technology stack. Further, even within the same
layer there are typically many claims floating around which pursue similar goals. It is to
be expected that many patents exist that show overlaps in the scope of protection.
Bittner, supra note 305. Zeller described this problem in the following way:
For IT inventions, the key challenge in addition to the large number of patents for both a
comprehensive search and its analysis is the lack of a standardised technical terminology.
One and the same innovation can be defined in different terms. Thus, even if a potentially
relevant patent can be identified, its scope of protection may be difficult to assess.
Zeller, supra note 309.
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typically resolved via cross-licensing patent portfolios. 309 Even good-faith
product clearance searches cannot deliver a clean and reliable report.310 It
is likely that any AI system will infringe dozens or even hundreds of
patents in various technology layers. In the AI-enabled world, all
industries, regardless of where they might have started, must embrace a
risk management strategy calibrated according to discernable patent
portfolios and players. 311 Market players should own aspects of AI
solutions that are attractive to others to improve their negotiating power
when the time comes to gain access to others’ patent portfolios.
Besides liability for patent infringement, AI can also pose a
challenge to patent validity. One key ground is that AI patents-in-suit fail
to recite patent-eligible claims. The Supreme Court noted forty years ago
that “[i]n choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and
‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any’; Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” 312
It explained that “Congress took this permissive approach to patent
eligibility to ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.’” 313 But the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern. sounded the death knell for many software
patents, including those covering AI inventions. 314 As the Honorable
Richard Linn of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed:
309. Bittner, supra note 305 (“In other words, you may have a patent on a particular invention
where somebody else has a patent on an invention that will necessarily be used for the implementation
of your own invention, thus providing a bar to commercial use of your own invention.”).
310. Bittner, supra note 305 (“[E]ven if a company acts in good faith and has made a product
clearance search before going to market with a new product, in the digital world there is always a
high risk that other IP rights (at other layers and even at the same layer) are infringed.”); see also
Zeller, supra note 309 (“The market players will prefer to respect third-party patents through a riskbased FTO analysis followed by cross-licensing of patent portfolios, including mutual balance
payments.”).
311. Bittner, supra note 305 (“Dependent on the associated risk, the range of actions may
include anything from ‘ignore the IP right’ to ‘take your product off the market.’”).
312. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980).
313. Id. at 308.
314. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (Alice articulated a
two-part test for whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101(2018): whether they are directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon,
or an abstract idea, and if so, whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient
to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion. The end goal was
to “distinguish patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from patents
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.”); id. at 217 (Alice stated that there is
“considerable overlap between step one and step two, and in some situations this analysis could be
accomplished without going beyond step one.” Rather than focusing on a generally-accepted and
understood definition of, or test for, what an “abstract idea” encompasses, courts instead “examine
earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what prior cases were
about, and which way they were decided.”).
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“Despite the number of cases that have faced these questions. . .great
uncertainty yet remains. And the danger of getting the answers to these
questions wrong is greatest for some of today’s most important inventions
in computing,” including “artificial intelligence.”315
Computer-implemented inventions have been patentable since the
1990s. 316 However, widespread use of AI in patents and related innovation
may be limited by the patentability of those inventions, making return on
investment uncertain. 317 Many AI patents recite generic computer
implementation of abstract processes, or contain elements that are wellunderstood, routine, and conventional such as taking input data, running
the data through an algorithm, and obtaining output data. 318 While
machine learning strives to train a computer to do something humans
cannot practically do, that result is insufficient to avoid invalidity. Claims
“reciting specific types of data associations, detailing the training phase

315. Tobey, supra note 300.
316. Bittner, supra note 305 (“For decades, patent protection for so-called computerimplemented inventions has been available and most of the major patent offices grant such claims on
software-related inventions when the software is used to solve a technical problem in a non-obvious
manner.”); see Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global Artificial Intelligence Revolution Challenges Patent
Eligibility Laws, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 15 (2017) (“[C]ases illustrate the importance of specificity
and technical contribution in establishing patent eligibility of artificial intelligence under United
States law.”).
317. Hashiguchi, supra note 33, at 29 (“The implicit, de facto requirements for patent eligibility
may be at odds with the nature presently manifested by artificial intelligence technology.”).
318. See, e.g., PurePredictive, Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 WL 3721480
(N.D. Cal. 2017). The invention was a way of generating a “predictive ensemble in an automated
manner . . . regardless of the particular field or application, with little or no input from a user or
expert” via machine learning. Id. at *1. The district court found that the claims amounted collecting
and analyzing information and did not improve a technological process. Particularly, “[t]he first step,
generating learned functions or regressions from data—the basic mathematical process of, for
example, regression modeling, or running data through an algorithm—is not a patentable concept.”
Id. at *5. Further, the next two steps were mathematical processes that not only could be performed
by humans but also go to the general abstract concept of predictive analytics rather than any specific
application. The court found that “just because a computer can make calculations more quickly than
a human does not render a method patent eligible,” even if it would be physically impossible for a
human to do so. Id. Moving on to part two of Alice, the claimed ensemble technique addressed a broad
scope of problems rather than being focused on solving a specific technical problem. Furthermore,
the claims did not describe a specific physical architecture and instead was focused on software
modules. As a consequence, the claims failed both parts of the Alice test, were ruled ineligible under
§ 101, and therefore held invalid. See Michael Borella, The Subject Matter Eligibility of Machine
Learning: An Early Take, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 23, 2018) http://www.patentdocs.org/2018/09/thesubject-matter-eligibility-of-machine-learning-an-early-take.html
[http://perma.cc/FL7A-RZRE]
(“machine learning claims can potentially be even more vulnerable to § 101 challenges when the
claims recite only data manipulation and do not provide a well-defined technological need or
advantage.”).
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and/or the structure of the model, and placing the model within the context
of a larger system” would more likely survive invalidity challenges.319
Jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter imposes a strict but
unclear set of rules on computer-implemented technology. 320 The policy’s
impetus to require specificity and description of technical improvement
aims to prevent preemption. 321 Yet, “if the patent eligibility jurisprudence
imposes requirements that cannot realistically be met by AI inventions
due to the technology’s inherent nature, these inventions will inevitably
be foreclosed from patent protection.” 322 Further, with the 4IR blurring
the boundaries among industries, biomedical AI inventions related to
methods and apparatuses that perform AI-enabled analyses face similarly
high hurdles as software. 323 After Alice, courts are more likely to uphold
AI patents aimed at improving software itself rather than the world around
it. 324
The European Patent Office (EPO) recently issued guidelines on the
patentability of AI and machine learning technologies. 325 AI technologies
are treated as “mathematical methods” and thus patent ineligible unless

319. Borella, supra note 320.
320. Hashiguchi, supra note 33, at 10 (“[B]y comparing the claim with those that were found to
be directed to abstract ideas in previous cases. Hence, examining court decisions on patent eligibility
is vital to understanding the range of artificial intelligence inventions that are likely to be regarded as
patent-eligible.”).
321. Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (“Laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work,” adding that the “monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”); see also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“The concern underlying the exceptions to [35 U.S.C.] § 101
is not tangibility, but preemption.”).
322. Hashiguchi, supra note 33, at 28 (“Patent eligibility laws, in their current form, would not
be able to confer their benefits to protect artificial intelligence technology.”).
323. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding a novel
method of prenatal diagnosis of fetal DNA was patent-ineligible because the presence of cell-free
fetal DNA was a natural phenomenon method steps “were well-understood, conventional, and
routine,” despite acknowledging it was a “breakthrough”); see Susan Y. Tull & Paula E. Miller,
Patenting Artificial Intelligence: Issues of Obviousness, Inventorship, and Patent Eligibility, 1 J.
ROBOTICS,
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
&
L.
313,
317
(2018),
https://www.finnegan.com/images/content/1/9/v2/197825/PUBLISHED-The-Journal-of-RoboticsArtificial-Intelligence-L.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP3Z-QX7A] (warning that the current law “could
well curtail the patent protections afforded medical AI absent a change in Supreme Court precedent
or statute”).
324. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 222–25 (The Supreme Court has suggested that
claims “purport[ing] to improve the functioning of the computer itself,” or “improv[ing] an existing
technological process” might not succumb to the abstract idea exception).
325. European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination § 3.3.1, (2018),
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines2018/e/g_ii_3_3_1.htm
[http://perma.cc/M4PB-5295] (dealing with “artificial intelligence and machine learning”).

870

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:813

“directed either to a method involving the use of technical means (e.g. a
computer) or to a device,” which gives the subject matter a “technical
character.” 326 The guidelines give two examples of such a technical
application: first, a neural network in a heart-monitoring apparatus to
identify irregular heartbeats; second, AI classifying digital content based
on attributes such as pixels. 327 The EPO’s guidelines are the first official
patent examination guidance specifically to address the eligibility of AIgenerated inventions. 328
If a similar position is taken in the U.S., AI related to controlling or
manipulating tangible or intangible objects would face minimal
scrutiny 329—so would claims directed to specific data structures, rules,
combinations, or steps that result in improvements in computer
functions. 330 In contrast, high-level user implementations using a generalpurpose computer would not. 331 Patent applicants would do well to detail
“the computing or mathematical techniques applied by the system or
describing how the computer interacts with other components to drive the
AI processing.” 332
Another difficulty for AI inventions is describing how the AI
produces the result. Even AI developers cannot explain “why and how
their computer programs made an artificial intelligence system behave in
a certain way.” 333 One way around that issue is to make explicit what is
implicit. A company called Cortica connected a live, cortical segment of
a rat’s brain to a microelectrode array. This enabled Cortica to study how
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Aaron Gin, EPO Releases Patentability Guidance for AI-based Applications, PATENT
DOCS (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/10/epo-releases-patentability-guidance-forai-based-applications.html [http://perma.cc/Y4PW-PPWG].
329. Jonathan Bockman et al., Patenting Artificial Intelligence in the U.S.–Considerations for
AI Companies, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Nov. 8 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/patentingartificial-intelligence-in-60718/ [http://perma.cc/RX6J-ZJWB].
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Tull, supra note 325.
333. Hashiguchi, supra note 33, at 29. The article further states:
The mechanism of artificial intelligence is often inexplicable. Even computer scientists
who write computer programs for artificial intelligence systems sometimes have difficulty
explaining why and how their computer programs made an artificial intelligence system
behave in a certain way. This reality conflicts with the de facto specificity requirement. . . .
Under the present patent eligibility jurisprudence, an invention is more likely to be deemed
ineligible for patent protection if the configuration of the invention is not described with
specificity. However, the configuration of some artificial intelligence cannot be understood, let alone described with specificity. Such artificial intelligence inventions are likely
to be foreclosed from patent protection.
Hashiguchi, supra note 33, at 29–30.
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electrical signals interact with the cortex, to identify neurons responsible
for processing specific stimuli, and from there, to build models to simulate
the brain’s processes. 334 This breakthrough allows patents more
accurately to describe the processes involved in implanting AI algorithms.
It also allows developers to pinpoint where the AI made an erroneous
analysis and to retrain its deep-learning neural networks.
The characterization of patents as a “public franchise” rather than a
property right has also made their value less certain. 335 Trade secrets are
sometimes a viable alternative if reverse engineering is difficult, as this
avoids the uncertainty of compliance with the vague standard, as well as
lengthy and costly validity and infringement determinations. 336 However,
if the subject matter has become public, both patent protection and trade
secret protection will be unavailable. 337 Yet despite the uncertainty of
software-related patents, AI patent filings (which are based on software
code) have grown dramatically across the major jurisdictions. 338 And this
is cause for cheer.
Investment in AI patents represent faith in a cornerstone technology
that could accelerate innovation, requiring less human skill and fewer
resources over time. In particular, AI provides a means to achieve
inventions that human cognitive limitations cannot achieve. Disclosure
through published patents would nourish and spur scientific endeavor.
Following the wake of mobile phones, television, and radio, affordable
AI-generated technology could help democratize the benefits of those
endeavors. Then again, this assumes that the patent prosecution system

334. Quain, supra note 35 (“The result, according to Cortica, is an approach to AI that allows
for advanced learning while remaining transparent.”).
335. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018)
(“This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to grant a patent is a
matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”); Gene Quinn, The
Supreme Court is wrong, a patent is not a franchise (May 1, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/01/supreme-court-patent-franchise/id=96644/
[http://perma.cc/2SJR-YLJP].
336. Robert Stoll, Alternative Routes to Protection of Innovation, IPWATCHDOG (June 13,
2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/13/alternative-routes-to-protection-ofinnovation/id=98373/ [http://perma.cc/AC8F-L2TP] (“Innovative algorithms . . . may be easier and
more effectively protected by trade secret.”).
337. Andrea W. Jeffries et al., Protecting Artificial Intelligence IP: Patents, Trade Secrets, or
Copyrights?, JONES DAY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/protecting-artificial-intelligenceip-patents-trade-secrets-or-copyrights-01-09-2018/ [https://perma.cc/47XD-96TP].
338. World IP Organization, WIPO Technology Trends 2019 – Artificial Intelligence, WIPO
(2019), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1055.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ZRQ-TLRA]
(noting the largest portfolio of AI patents is held by IBM, with 8,290. Other top AI patent-holders
include Microsoft with 5,930, Toshiba with 5,223, Samsung with 5,102, and NEC with 4,406. Of the
four academic institutions in the top 30, three are from China.).
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remains viable, and that it will take AI to ensure that the system remains
so.
D.

AI & Patent Prosecution

The overwhelming volume of potential prior art makes any novelty
or nonobviousness analysis uncertain. 339 The PTO issued its ten millionth
patent in June 2018, which joined “over 100 million other patent
documents, 70 million plus journal articles and over four billion indexed
web pages in the corpus of information that potentially needs to be
searched to establish novelty.” 340 The pace at which the corpus of prior
art grows continues to accelerate. “It took 122 years to issue the one
millionth patent in 1911. It took just over three years to go from nine
million to 10 million.” 341 The PTO has shown an openness to AI
innovation, with an 89% allowance rate for AI patents from 2011 to early
2018. 342
Deciphering the sea of potential prior art has also become more
difficult. Six in ten patent documents are now in Chinese, Japanese, or
Korean, often without an English language equivalent. 343 In addition,
today’s innovation takes place at the intersection of different art units, and
patent examination has not kept pace. AI will be crucial to help break the
language barriers needed to bring all this prior art onto a single
interoperable highway for search and examination. Further, rather than
expecting human examiners to be proficient in a multitude of highly
complex and specialist disciplines, AI can unlock insights hidden behind
those barriers.
Along with the four other largest patent offices in the world—China,
Korea, Japan, and the European Union—the PTO is on a drive to reduce
339. Wild, supra note 247 (“The patent system today is challenged as never before. The
requirements of novelty and non-obviousness are becoming increasingly difficult to meet and
determine with any great level of certainty.”); There are myriad issues facing the global patent system
which, if not addressed, could lead to a decline in its use. Put simply, there is way too much data for
humans to properly digest.
340. Wild, supra note 247.
341. Wild, supra note 247.
342. Eric Sutton, Artificial Intelligence 2.0: Artificially Intelligent Guidance For Obtaining
Artificial Intelligence Patents, as presented to IPO, PATNOTECHNIC (Mar. 7, 2018),
www.patnotechnic.com/2018/04/artificial-intelligence-20-artificially.html [http://perma.cc/RE5C5CFE].
343. Id. (“Secondly, for some time we have operated in a world where the majority of new
inventions don’t have any detail in English. Of the 5.6 million patent documents published globally
in 2017, over 62% are in Chinese, Japanese or Korean, often with no English language equivalent.
This too is problematic. It means that the working language of innovation is essentially robbed of the
open disclosure intended when patent exclusivity is given out.”).
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redundancy and improve patent quality. 344 All five patent offices share the
view that AI will be critical to these efforts. 345 Key applications of AI
include classification, prior art searches, and machine translations. For
example, AI augments prior art searches by matching ideas, not merely
keywords. The searches identify the most relevant technical literature
quickly, as keywords are converted into multiple concepts from a database
of interrelated concepts. 346
AI is replacing boolean and positional searching for patent-related
discovery. These legacy methods use syntaxes and manual categorization
to comb through large amounts of patent literature. In addition to
replicating the same processes more efficiently, AI can overcome
ambiguities that confound classic keyword searches by searching similar
concepts in parallel. 347 This “essentially solves the problem searchers run
into when they don’t know what they don’t know.” 348 The search results
deliver comprehensive and relevant useful results with less redundancy to
get to the proverbial result needle in a patent-search haystack.
V. CONCLUSION
From a glimmer in the eye of a Victorian woman ahead of her time,
AI has become a cornerstone of innovation that “will be the defining
technology of our time.” 349 In turn, AI can make a difference in
accelerating disruptive innovation by bringing a data-driven approach to

344. Carl Kukkonen & Matt Johnson, Major Patent Offices Meet to Discuss Adoption of AI
Tools, JONES DAY: PTAB LITIG. BLOG (July 3, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=80f9ca5f-a2d3-47f6-a588-4156e405b85b
[http://perma.cc/3MM3-FLGK]
(“The goal of the IP5 is to eliminate unnecessary duplication of efforts amongst the IP5 offices as
well as increasing the efficiency of patent examination efficiency and quality.”).
345. Id. (“During the meeting, the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the patent system was
identified as one of the main strategic priorities for the offices.”).
346. Sandeep Kumar, Patent Search: The Evolution from Manual to Artificial Intelligence,
AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/patent-search-evolution-manualartificial-intelligence [http://perma.cc/HJ6G-ZX44] (“The technology is evolving rapidly, with search
tools entering the market which rival human cognition – such tools have the capacity and knowledge
to apply logical permutations and combinations to patent data in order generate insight that would be
indeterminable to a human researcher.”).
347. Baxter, supra note 84 (“For example, our InnovationQ software is powered by [AI], which
understands that two terms — like “vehicle” and “car”— can have similar meanings and single terms
— like “stream” — can have multiple unrelated meanings.”).
348. Baxter, supra note 86 (For example, if a searcher is seeking documents regarding
“exchanging data using short distance radio,” they may not realize they’re describing Bluetooth. But
AI, based on the codes applied to concepts attached to the keywords, understands the relationship and
the results may include documents containing “Bluetooth” that do not contain one or more of the
provided search terms.”).
349. Allen, supra note 96.

874

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:813

invention and creation. In 2016, the convergence of computing power,
funding, data, and open-source platforms tipped us into an AI-driven 4IR.
By processing non-critical information, extending the time for meaningful
thought, and identifying valuable information, AI increases the
computational abilities of human brains, augmenting our creative and
innovative endeavors. AI gives us the ability to extend the bounds of our
rationality, and thereby the quality of the decisions we can make.
In thinking about how IP considerations apply to AI, it is helpful to
remember the observation of 19th century Danish philosopher, Søren
Kierkegaard, that “life can only be understood backwards; but it must be
lived forwards.” 350 Hindsight allows us to look back and understand the
consequences of our policy choices. Just as past is not necessarily
prologue, hindsight does not necessarily translate into foresight. The law
must embrace change and innovation as an imperative in a journey
towards an ever-shifting horizon. 351 The goal is to make better decisions
today that shape the future, rather than try to regulate by predicting the
future. To do this well, we need to encourage AI that both augments and
disrupts how we think about creativity and innovation.
In the creative arts, AI learns what we consider to be beautiful and
creates permutations both within and outside of those boundaries. At
times, it may augment artistic endeavor by providing flashes of inspiration
in a collaborative dance. AI evolved from augmentation, to co-creation,
to becoming the artist. In many instances, WFH provides a pragmatic
legal vehicle for interests to vest and negotiated by the commercial
interests best placed to encourage investment in both the technology and
its downstream uses. Like human-generated work, AI-generated work is
an amalgam of mimicry mined from our own learning and experience.
The training data it draws upon, both for expressive and non-expressive
uses, are merely grist for AI’s mill. 352 Consequently, fair use must be
liberally applied to prevent holdup by copyright owners and stifling
transformative uses enabled by AI. AI can also be used to decipher
complex copyright infringement cases such as those involving musical
compositions. In the technological arts, the controversy will revolve
around who owns innovative breakthroughs primarily or totally
attributable to AI. How should these breakthroughs affect regard for the
350. See SØREN KIERKEGAARD, JOURNALEN JJ:167 (1843), reprinted in SØREN KIERKEGAARD,
18 SKRIFTER 306 (1997), http://homepage.math.uiowa.edu/~jorgen/kierkegaardquotesource.html
[http://perma.cc/D6FR-5JXM].
351. Ho, supra note 230.
352. See generally Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1503 (2012) (discussing on copyrighted works used non-expressively).
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notion of PHOSITA? How does AI change the equation when it comes to
infringement? And how can AI help save the patent system from
obsolescence? In these areas, AI both enables and challenges how we
reward individuals whose ingenuity, industry, and determination
overcame the frailty of the human condition to offer us inventions that
make our lives more efficient and pleasurable.
Ultimately, the promise and challenge that AI brings resides neither
in machines nor in people individually. Instead, it emerges from their
interplay. AI-generated work and inventions pass the Turing Test with
flying colors. AI’s real test is whether legal architecture built around the
premise of human artistic and innovative endeavors may stifle its
evolution. This process of creative destruction fuels each successive
industrial revolution. Both copyright law and patent law need to address
this reality head-on. The current system can adapt to the 4IR, but the rules
must be applied wisely.

